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PROSPECTS FOR REGULATION OF OFF-
LABEL DRUG PROMOTION IN AN ERA OF
EXPANDING COMMERCIAL SPEECH
PROTECTION*
AARON S. KESSELHEIM & MICHELLE M. MELLO**
On December 3, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit handed the government yet another setback in its
quest to stem the deleterious public health effects of aggressive
pharmaceutical marketing. United States v. Caronia involved a
First Amendment challenge to a pharmaceutical sales
representative's criminal misdemeanor prosecution for
promoting the narcolepsy drug Xyrem for multiple off-label uses
by making oral statements about uses of the drug not approved
by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") during sales
calls to a physician's office. On the basis of evidence about his
statements presented at trial, the representative, Alfred Caronia,
was convicted of conspiracy to introduce a misbranded drug into
interstate commerce. In a 2-1 decision, the Second Circuit held
that the government had prosecuted Caronia, in violation of his
First Amendment rights, because he engaged in constitutionally
protected commercial speech.
In this Article, we review the implications of the Caronia decision
for the FDA's ability to regulate off-label promotion and set it in
the context of other major court decisions related to the scope of
First Amendment protection for commercial speech concerning
pharmaceuticals. After summarizing the statutory and regulatory
framework governing off-label promotional communications, we
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review relevant precedent and the Caronia decision. Considering
both the Caronia case and other precedents, we then consider
what avenues remain for FDA regulation of off-label promotion
by pharmaceutical manufacturers.
We discuss five potential strategies. The first three revolve around
key technical issues arising from Caronia: ensuring that
prosecutions are based on written rather than oral statements,
emphasizing that speech is being used as evidence of intent, and
focusing on the false or misleading nature of the promotional
materials. The fourth involves a frontal challenge to the Second
Circuit panel's decision in Caronia-we suggest ways in which
the government could make a stronger case that its regulatory
framework for off-label promotion satisfies the criteria of the
Central Hudson test. Finally, we consider alternative regulatory
regimes for off-label promotion, such as limited approvals of off-
label indications paired with limits on prescribing and
accelerated supplemental FDA approval for promotion of
unapproved uses. These options may be useful if the government
has to intervene to prevent the substantial public health risks of
unfettered off-label promotion that may emerge in a post-
Caronia world.
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INTRODUCTION
In December 2012, a three-judge panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit set down a decision shaking
the very foundation of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's
("FDA's") regulation of pharmaceutical approval and promotion.
The case, United States v. Caronia,' involved a Department of Justice
criminal misdemeanor prosecution of a pharmaceutical sales
representative named Alfred Caronia who was caught on tape
promoting a drug for conditions not approved by the FDA.2 The
FDA generally prohibits manufacturers and their representatives
from engaging in so-called "off-label" promotion, considering intent
to introduce a misbranded product in violation of provisions of the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA" or "the Act") that
require all prescription drugs sold in the United States to be
supported by substantial evidence from adequate and well-controlled
trials.3 At trial, Caronia argued that his First Amendment right to free
speech protected him from being prosecuted for his statements, and
the Second Circuit panel agreed.4 The majority opinion, which covers
New York, Connecticut, and Vermont, held that the FDA's
prohibition on promotion of off-label drug uses was inherently
suspect under the Constitution's First Amendment protection of
commercial speech.s
1. 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
2. Id. at 156. As we will later discuss, the. promotional statements involved
indications for which the drug was not proven to work and may have been unsafe. See
infra Part III.
3. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012).
4. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 158, 168-69.
5. See id.; see also Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2674 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (remarking on "the constitutional importance of maintaining a free
marketplace of ideas").
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But the FDA's restriction on off-label promotion is not a
capricious attempt to restrict manufacturers from communicating to
physicians about their products. Rather, the FDA's approach was
honed over decades of debate in response to major problems caused
by the lack of such regulation. The requirement that a manufacturer
must document and accurately report drug and device efficacy and
side effects was a response to public health tragedies in which patients
died after taking products with poisonous constituents (sulfanilamide
elixir, 1938),' gave birth to babies with devastating congenital
anomalies (thalidomide, 1962),' or used contraceptive devices that
caused bacterial sepsis (Dalkon Shield, 1974) 8-all occurring in the
context of wide manufacturer promotion of their safety.' Even more
common was the promotion of drugs to treat conditions for which
they totally lacked efficacy. 0 Consensus grew that it was in the
public's interest for manufacturers to prove that a medication actually
worked before it could be sold and promoted.
Despite these rules, the past decade has revealed that off-label
promotion is quite common in the drug and medical device industries.
Nearly every major manufacturer has now been investigated by
government prosecutors for violating the FDCA and the FDA's
enabling rules on off-label promotion. All of these cases also
involved important risks to public health related to the off-label uses.
A partial list of products for which inappropriate off-label marketing
has led to widespread patient morbidity and mortalityl2 includes
6. Jerry Avorn, Two Centuries of Assessing Drug Risks, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 193,
195-96 (2012).
7. Id.
8. See Mike Mitka, IUDs Effective but Underused Options for Emergency and Long-
Term Contraception, 307 JAMA 2473, 2473 (2012); Susan F. Wood, Women's Health and
the FDA, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1650, 1650 (2005).
9. Avorn, supra note 6, at 194; Jerry Avorn, Learning About the Safety of Drugs-A
Half-Century of Evolution, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2151, 2151 (2011).
10. Henry A. Waxman, A History of Adverse Drug Experiences: Congress Had Ample
Evidence to Support Restrictions on the Promotion of Prescription Drugs, 58 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 299, 299-300 (2003). See generally DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND
POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA
(2010) (discussing events in the pharmaceutical industry that preceded the regulatory
inclusion of an efficacy requirement).
11. See Sammy Almashat & Sidney Wolfe, Pharmaceutical Industry Criminal and
Civil Penalties: An Update, PUB. CITIZEN 4 (Sept. 27, 2012), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/2073.pdf (describing a total of 239 settlements for $30.2
billion reached between federal and state governments from 1991 to 2012).
12. See generally John N. Joseph et al., Enforcement Related to Off-Label Marketing
and Use of Drugs and Devices: Where Have We Been and Where Are We Going?, 2 J.
HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 73 (2009) (describing major civil settlements and criminal pleas).
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rofecoxib (Vioxx), rosiglitazone (Avandia),14 paroxetine (Paxil),5
fenfluramine/phentermine (Fen-Phen),16 and telithromycin (Ketek)."7
Entire classes of drugs have been affected as well, including the
promotion of antipsychotic drugs in elderly patients with dementia"
or the promotion of antiepileptic medicationsl9 for certain types of
mood disorders, both of which have been shown to increase mortality.
Settlements of government investigations of illegal off-label
marketing have led to over $12 billion in civil and criminal fines.2 0
The Caronia case applied First Amendment scrutiny of
government restrictions on commercial speech to upend FDA rules
on off-label marketing and threatens to be a major step in the judicial
deconstruction of our country's decades-old system of drug
regulation.2 1 Caronia draws from a line of Supreme Court cases that
review restrictions on commercial speech in the pharmaceutical
market and largely reject them in the name of the same core
principles: a skepticism of government "paternalism" intruding into
consumers' ability to receive useful information, a view of physician
consumers of this information as learned consumers who can
efficiently weed out useful scientific facts from promotional speech
about pharmaceuticals, an unwillingness to interfere with a
marketplace of ideas that leads to optimal economic decision making
about therapeutic choices, and a presumption that the information
13. See Harlan M. Krumholz et al., What Have We Learnt from Vioxx?, 334 BMJ 120
(2007).
14. See Ray Moynihan, Rosiglitazone, Marketing, and Medical Science, 340 BMJ c1848
(2010).
15. See Meredith Wadman, Spitzer Sues Drug Giant for Deceiving Doctors, 429
NATURE 589 (2004).
16. See Gina Kolata, How Fen-Phen, A Diet 'Miracle,' Rose and Fell, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 23, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/23/science/how-fen-phen-a-diet-miracle-
rose-and-fell.html?src=pm&pagewanted=1.
17. See David B. Ross, The FDA and the Case of Ketek, 356 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1601
(2007).
18. G. Caleb Alexander et al., Increasing Off-Label Use of Antipsychotic Medications
in the United States, 1995-2008, 20 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY DRUG SAFETY 177, 177-
78 (2011).
19. Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., False Claims Act Prosecution Did Not Deter Off-Label
Drug Use in the Case of Neurontin, 30 HEALTH AFF. 2318, 2318 (2011).
20. Brady Dennis, Johnson & Johnson Agrees to Pay $2.2 Billion in Drug Marketing
Settlement, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-
science/johnson-and-johnson-agrees-to-pay-22-billion-in-drug-marketing-settlement/2013
/11/04/a7092342-456a-11e3-b6f8-3782ff6cb769_story.html ("The Justice Department said it
has recovered nearly $17 billion since 2009 by bringing cases under the False Claims Act,
with about $12 billion of that involving fraud against federal health-care programs.").
21. Aaron S. Kesselheim, Michelle M. Mello & Jerry Avorn, FDA Regulation of Off-
Label Drug Promotion Under Attack, 309 JAMA 445, 446 (2013).
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imparted in pharmaceutical promotion is truthful and not misleading.
However, none of these assumptions about off-label promotion
stands up to closer scrutiny.
In Part I of this Article, we review current FDA off-label
promotion rules and then in Part II turn to the Supreme Court's
application of the commercial free speech doctrine to three key
pharmaceutical promotion cases. Our goal is to crystallize the main
principles guiding judicial review of regulation of pharmaceutical
promotion. In Part III, we review the direct challenges to the current
policies preventing off-label promotion, including Caronia, to dispute
the rationale underlying the majority's decision.
Finally, in Part IV, we conclude by analyzing the range of options
available for the FDA to maintain oversight of off-label prescription
drug promotion despite the rising tide of commercial speech
jurisprudence. Two strategies that cue off technical issues in the
Caronia decision are (1) basing prosecutions on written rather than
oral statements and (2) emphasizing that speech is being used merely
as evidence of intent. A third strategy is to characterize promotional
materials as false or misleading. A fourth strategy is to make a
stronger case that the FDA regulations on off-label promotion satisfy
the criteria of the Central Hudson test. A fifth strategy is to modify
FDA regulations concerning off-label promotion to make expanded
use of "safe harbors."
I. CURRENT FDA OFF-LABEL PROMOTION RULES
The FDCA does not explicitly proscribe off-label drug
promotion. Rather, it prohibits introducing any new drug or
biological product that has not been approved by the FDA or is
misbranded.22 For a drug to be legally marketed in the United States,
the manufacturer must submit a New Drug Application ("NDA").
The FDA may approve an NDA only if it contains reports of
investigations that show the drug is safe for the use or uses stated in
the drug's proposed labeling.23 In addition, since 1962, the
manufacturer has also been required to demonstrate that the drug
22. See 21 U.S.C. § 331(d) (2012); id. § 355(a) ("No person shall introduce or deliver
for introduction into interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an
application . . . is effective .... ); id. § 331(a) (forbidding the introduction of adulterated
or misbranded food or drugs into commerce); id. § 352(a) (defining false or misleading
labels as misbranded drugs or devices); id. § 352(f) (discussing directions for use and
warnings on labels).
23. See id. § 355(b)(1) (listing application requirements).
[Vol. 921544
2014] REGULATING OFF-LABEL DRUG PROMOTION 1545
shows efficacy for the uses described in the labeling.24 Specifically, the
FDA can authorize the sale of the drug if there is "substantial
evidence that the drug will have the effect it purports or is
represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling ....
"Substantial evidence" was first defined in the 1962 amendments to
the FDCA as
evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled
investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts
qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the
effectiveness of the drug involved, on the basis of which it could
fairly and responsibly be concluded by such experts that the
drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have
under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or
suggested in the labeling or proposed labeling... .26
When the FDA approves a drug for introduction into interstate
commerce, the Act ties approval to how the drug is described in its
labeling materials. 27 Each approval thus represents a careful balancing
of the risks and benefits of the drug for that particular indication. A
sponsor submits the "labeling proposed to be used" for the drug
concurrently with submitting the product for FDA approval,2 8 and
must submit "mailing pieces and any other labeling or advertising
devised for promotion of the drug" when they are first used.2 9
Permission to sell a new drug can be withheld if the labeling is "false
or misleading in any particular."30 Violation of the labeling
requirements is considered to be a criminal offense.
The FDCA defines "labeling" to include "all labels and other
written, printed, or graphic matters (1) upon any article or any of its
containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article."3 2 The
24. See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 102, 76 Stat. 780, 781
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)).
25. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d).
26. Drug Amendments of 1962 § 102.
27. SUSAN THAUL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41983, How FDA APPROVES
DRUGS AND REGULATES THEIR SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS 2-3 (2012).
28. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(F).
29. 21 C.F.R. § 314.81(b)(3) (2013).
30. 21 U.S.C. § 352(a).
31. See id. § 333(a) (describing criminal sentences and fines); 42 U.S.C. § 262(f) (2006)
(same).
32. 21 U.S.C. § 321(m). This definition distinguishes the broad term "labeling" from
the narrower term "label," which is defined as "a display of written, printed, or graphic
matter upon the immediate container of any article." Id. § 321(k). Although the term "off-
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Supreme Court has construed the term "accompanying" in this
definition broadly, creating grounds for the FDA to prosecute
misbranding on the basis of statements made in a variety of other
fora. One of the most important components of the labeling materials
is the prescribing information, a multi-page pamphlet that describes
approved uses of the product, evidence upon which these uses are
based, and relevant safety information about the product, such as its
known adverse effects.34 However, in subsequent regulations, the
FDA has interpreted this definition to include essentially all audio or
visual material containing drug information distributed by or on
behalf of the manufacturer.
Once a drug is approved, physicians have autonomy to prescribe
it for any indication and patient population and at any dose, including
those not described in the official labeling materials-so-called "off-
label" uses.36 Off-label uses are often medically appropriate,
especially for patients with no other therapeutic alternatives where
the drug's effectiveness is biologically plausible. There may be some
evidence accumulating for the off-label use from clinical trials or
label" rather than "off-labeling" is used in the common parlance, such prosecutions can be
based on statements throughout the drug's labeling.
33. See, e.g., Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 347-49 (1948) (holding that
pamphlets that a manufacturer provided to drug retailers for the purpose of advertising
and explaining the drugs to consumers constituted part of the drugs' labeling).
34. The product information document is mostly written by the manufacturer and is
intended to educate the prescribing practitioner, although in recent years its format has
been changed to make certain parts of it more accessible to non-professionals.
35. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(1)(2) (2013). But see Allison D. Burroughs et al., Off-Label
Promotion: Government Theories of Prosecution and Facts that Drive Them, 65 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 555, 559 (2010) ("The statutory definition of labeling encompasses only written
materials and this construction is supported by the case law."). However, this exclusion of
oral statements is relevant only to an enforcement action against a pharmaceutical
manufacturer for unlawful introduction of an unapproved "new drug" under § 352(a) of
the misbranding statute. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(a). By contrast, prosecutions of
pharmaceutical manufacturers for unlawful introduction of a misbranded drug due to
labeling that bears "inadequate directions for use" under § 352(f) of the statute can be
supported by oral statements based on the FDA's subsequent interpretation of the statute.
See id. § 352(f). Burroughs et al. note "if any conduct by a manufacturer or its sales agents,
including oral statements, suggests an intent that its drug product be used off label, then
the drug would arguably be misbranded under section 352(f) because the drug's labeling
would not have 'adequate directions' for such off-label use." Burroughs et al., supra, at
563.
36. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HFI-22, USE
OF APPROVED DRUGS FOR UNLABELED INDICATIONS 4-5 (1982); Legal Status of
Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs; Prescribing for Uses Unapproved by the Food
and Drug Administration, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,503, 16,503 (Aug. 15, 1972) (codified at 21
C.F.R. pt. 130); see also Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub.
L. No. 105-115, § 214, 111 Stat. 2296, 2348 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2012)) (enunciating
a similar rule for medical devices).
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other studies organized after the drug is approved. In some cases,
industry sponsors may take this evidence to the FDA via a
supplemental NDA and receive a secondary indication for the
product; for a variety of reasons, though, companies may not always
take this step.37
However, it is also true that the majority of off-label prescribing
occurs in the absence of supporting evidence and not for patients with
rare diseases and no other legitimate therapeutic choices." One study
of prescribing patterns for 160 drugs, including the 100 that are
prescribed most in office-based practice, found a 21% off-label
prescription rate and concluded that "[a]mong off-label mentions,
most (73%) lacked evidence."39
A manufacturer who promotes off-label uses risks criminal
liability under the FDCA if its drug is found to be "misbranded."4 0
Drugs can be misbranded for false or misleading labeling information
or labeling that does not bear "adequate directions for use."4' Since
the only legitimate source of information about directions for use is
the FDA-approved labeling information, directions provided by the
manufacturer for using the drug in an off-label context are not
permitted.
The combination of the requirements for approval and the
misbranding provision provide two avenues for restrictions on off-
label promotion: a drug promoted for unapproved uses may be
considered to be an "unapproved drug" for that use, or it may be
deemed "misbranded." Under either statutory provision, in the
FDA's view, it can be illegal for a drug's labeling to discuss uses of
the drug that the FDA has not validated as being supported by
substantial evidence.
37. Aaron S. Kesselheim, Off-Label Drug Use and Promotion: Balancing Public
Health Goals and Commercial Speech, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 227, 237 (2011) (describing
administrative delays and potential for negative determinations as reasons for failing to
submit a supplemental NDA for an existing off-label use).
38. See, e.g., Danielle Holley, Balancing on the Edge: The Implications and
Acceptability of Off-Label Drug Use, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 633, 656-57 (2009). Holley
recommends a post-approval registry for all patients receiving drugs off-label in which
"[pihysicians should be required to inform their patients of the regulatory status of the
drug, with physicians noting the off-label use, and obtain consent, explaining the possible
risks and the fact that most of the side-effects will be potentially unknown. Additionally,
physicians then will have to publish their findings." Id.
39. David C. Radley, Stan N. Finkelstein & Randall S. Stafford, Off-Label Prescribing
Among Office-Based Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1023 (2006).
40. 21 U.S.C. § 352 (2012).
41. Id. § 352(f)(1).
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The FDA's prohibition on a manufacturer's ability to discuss off-
label uses is not absolute. The most significant exceptions to the
FDA's restriction on manufacturer off-label promotion were
enumerated in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In 1996 and 1997, the
FDA released guidance documents setting out some permissible
forms of off-label marketing,42 including the practice of disseminating
reprints of medical journal articles and supporting Continuing
Medical Education ("CME") programs that discussed off-label uses.43
These "safe harbors" included responses to requests for scientific or
medical information initiated by health care professionals.' The FDA
enumerated circumstances under which such journal reprints could be
distributed and listed formal criteria for judging the independence of
a CME program from its sponsoring manufacturer for the purpose of
teaching physician attendees about off-label uses of the drugs being
discussed.4 5 In 1997, Congress passed the FDA Modernization Act
("FDAMA"), which contained amendments to the FDCA that
expressly allowed dissemination of journal reprints discussing off-
label uses if the manufacturer certified to the FDA that it would file a
supplemental NDA for the off-label use or submit to the FDA a
42. See, e.g., Advertising and Promotion; Guidances, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,800, 52,800-01
(Oct. 8, 1996).
43. See, e.g., Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational
Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,074, 64,075-76 (Dec. 3, 1997).
44. Citizen Petition Regarding the Food and Drug Administration's Policy on
Promotion of Unapproved Uses of Approved Drugs and Devices; Request for Comments,
59 Fed. Reg. 59,820, 59,823 (Nov. 18, 1994). Manufacturers may respond to unsolicited
requests for information with "responsive, nonpromotional, balanced scientific
information, which may include information on unapproved uses, without subjecting their
products to regulation based on the information." Id.
45. See OFFICE OF THE COMM'R, OFFICE OF POLICY, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GOOD REPRINT
PRACTICES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND MEDICAL
OR SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW USES OF APPROVED
DRUGS AND APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES (2009) [hereinafter 2009
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY], available at http://www.fda.gov/regulatoryinformation
/guidances/ucml25126.htm.
Scientific and medical information that concerns the safety or effectiveness of an
approved drug or approved or cleared medical device for an unapproved new use
that is not included in the product's approved labeling or statement of intended
uses (including unapproved new uses of approved drugs and approved or cleared
devices) is often published in journal articles or reference publications. These
publications are often distributed by manufacturers to healthcare professionals or
healthcare entities. When a manufacturer disseminates such medical and scientific
information, FDA recommends that the following principles of "Good Reprint
Practices" he followed.
Id. For more FDA guidance, see 62 Fed. Reg. at 64,074.
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protocol and schedule for conducting the requisite clinical studies
associated with filing a supplemental application.46 The reprints had
to be unabridged, published in a reputable medical journal, generally
devoid of accompanying promotional content, and contain a
disclaimer indicating that the uses discussed in the article were not
approved by the FDA.47
After the conservative Washington Legal Foundation filed suit, a
federal district court enjoined these guidance documents and
FDAMA provisions as potentially violating manufacturers'
commercial speech rights.48 However, the dispute was resolved in the
course of oral arguments before the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit.49 The FDA asserted that it would not use
violations of the FDAMA provision or the principles outlined in the
guidance documents as independent authority to prosecute a
manufacturer for off-label promotion, only as supporting evidence of
misbranding.so The court of appeals thus dismissed the case, finding
the FDA's statement tantamount to its admitting that the agency had
no "independent authority to regulate manufacturer speech" under
the guidance documents or FDAMA provision."
In January 2009, the FDA issued a guidance document that
reauthorized the reprint distribution rules and widened the ability of
drug manufacturers to distribute information on unapproved uses of
their products.5 2 The updated guidance document reiterated many of
the characteristics of journal article distribution practices described in
the FDAMA but loosened the restrictions on manufacturers by
46. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115,
§ 401, 111 Stat. 2296, 2356-58 (repealed 2006).
47. Id.
48. Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 71-72 (D.D.C. 1998),
judgment vacated in part sub. nom. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir.
2000).
In sum, the court finds that the restrictions in the Guidance Documents are more
extensive than necessary to serve the asserted government interest and that they
unduly burden important speech. Therefore, the Guidance Documents fail the
fourth prong of the Central Hudson test, rendering them incompatible with the
First Amendment.
Id. at 74.
49. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 335 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
50. Id. at 336.
51. Id. (reinforcing, despite its admission, that "the FDA retains the prerogative to
use both types of arguably promotional conduct as evidence in a misbranding or 'intended
use' enforcement action").
52. 2009 GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 45.
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allowing distribution of such materials even if a supplementary
application for approval of the off-label use was not pending.5 3
II. THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF COMMERCIAL
SPEECH RELATED TO PHARMACEUTICALS
Commercial speech historically had no protection under First
Amendment jurisprudence for nearly the first two hundred years of
American history. Indeed, the first time the question of whether the
First Amendment covered commercial speech came before the
Supreme Court in 1942, the Court ruled that restrictions on
commercial speech were a legitimate exercise of the government's
power to regulate commerce.54 In a unanimous decision in Valentine
v. Chrestensen,ss the Court held that while people may communicate
and disseminate personal opinions on public streets without undue
governmental burden, the Constitution "imposes no such restraint on
government as respects purely commercial advertising."5 6 Indeed,
according to the Court, "[w]hether, and to what extent, one may
promote or pursue a gainful occupation in the streets ... are matters
for legislative judgment.""
A fundamental change in the Supreme Court's interpretation of
commercial speech protections arose in the mid-1970s when the
Court established for the first time that commercial speech was
protected under the First Amendment." Soon thereafter, the Court
made clear that regulations seeking to limit advertising or other
speech proposing a commercial transaction needed to meet a
heightened standard of judicial scrutiny, though not as high as the
compelling government interest needed to justify a regulation of
political or social speech.5 9
Since that time, the Supreme Court has addressed commercial
speech in the context of pharmaceutical advertising on three separate
occasions, starting with Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.a in 1976. More recently, the question
of what restrictions can be imposed on commercial speech relating to
53. Id.
54. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942).
55. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
56. Id. at 54.
57. Id.
58. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975).
59. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63
(1980).
60. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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the use of prescription drugs was featured in the 2002 case of
Thompson v. Western States Medical Center6' and the 2011 case of
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.62 To help clarify the role that commercial
speech jurisprudence plays in the future of off-label marketing
regulations, we examine each of these cases in turn.
A. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
The Supreme Court's first clear statement that commercial
speech is protected under the First Amendment happened to arise in
a case concerning prescription drugs." The controversy stemmed
from a Virginia statute that made pharmacists guilty of
unprofessional conduct if they advertised or promoted any price, fee,
or discount for prescription drugs.' A consumer group brought the
challenge against the State Board of Pharmacy seeking a declaration
that the statute was unconstitutional because it violated plaintiffs'
First Amendment right to receive information about drug prices that
pharmacists wished to communicate to them through advertising.65
In finding the statute unconstitutional, the Court held that
speech proposing a commercial transaction was not so removed from
an "exposition of ideas" that it lacked all protection, and economic
interest alone does not disqualify speech from protection."6 The
decision to break new constitutional ground was made on the basis of
the "keen" interest that consumers have in the pricing information
being sought and that society has in the "free flow of commercial
information."" As the Court explained, "So long as we preserve a
predominantly free enterprise economy ... [i]t is a matter of public
interest that [private economic] decisions, in the aggregate, be
intelligent and well informed.""
The Virginia State Board decision did not, however, place
commercial speech entirely outside the sphere of proper regulation.
The Court clearly stated that illegal commercial transactions would
not be granted such protection, and "time, place, and manner"
restrictions could be valid "provided that they are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a
61. 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
62. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
63. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
64. Id. at 749-50.
65. Id. at 753 & n.10, 754.
66. Id. at 762 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
67. Id. at 763.
68. Id. at 765.
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significant governmental interest, and that in so doing they leave
open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information."69 In a final footnote, the Court also limited its holding
to commercial advertising by pharmacists, remarking that the
considerations could be different in other professions such as the
practice of medicine, which might be characterized by "enhanced
possibility for confusion and deception if they were to undertake
certain kinds of advertising. "0
Although the Virginia State Board case garnered a seven-justice
majority," two justices penned concurrences in which they
highlighted important limitations on the holding. The first
concurrence, from Chief Justice Warren Burger, sought to emphasize
the remark in the final footnote that the holding was limited to the
question of whether pharmacists could publicly list the retail prices of
drugs in their pharmacies and did not extend to commercial
circumstances "in which professional judgment is a large
component."72 He specifically invoked the important state interest in
regulating physicians,73 distinguishing the limited price transparency
sought in this case from regulation of commercial speech related to
the practice of medicine on the basis that the latter would be less
amenable to judicial review because it would be hard to determine
"which claims of superiority are 'misleading' and which are
justifiable."" In such cases, he argued, heightened judicial scrutiny
may not be appropriate, or may be more easily met."
The second concurrence, from Justice Potter Stewart, reinforced
Chief Justice Burger's inclination to limit the scope of the majority's
holding. Justice Stewart agreed with the majority that commercial
speech merited some constitutional protection, but he wrote
separately to emphasize that the only goal of extending such
protection was to contribute to the "flow of accurate and reliable
information" for consumers.7 6 The drug prices at issue in this case met
that standard in large part because unlike "ideological expression,"
"factual claims contained in commercial price or product
advertisements relate to tangible goods or services" and "may be
69. Id. at 771 (citations omitted).
70. Id. at 773 n.25.
71. Justice John Paul Stevens recused himself from the case. See id. at 773.
72. Id. at 774 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 775.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 781 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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tested empirically and corrected to reflect the truth."n He was not
willing to extend commercial speech protection to false, misleading,
deceptive, or other types of commercial communication that could
not be rigorously tested and verified."
Justice William Rehnquist's dissenting opinion emphasized two
points. First, he felt that the realm of commercial speech regulation
and determination of what information was useful for the public
interest was best handled by legislatures, not courts.79 Second, he
favored reviewing pharmaceutical advertising differently than
advertising for other commercial products because, "while
prescription drugs are a necessary and vital part of medical care and
treatment," he noted, "there are sufficient dangers attending their
widespread use that they simply may not be promoted in the same
manner as hair creams, deodorants, and toothpaste." 0
Given the special dangers of prescription drugs and the
complexity of medical prescribing decisions, Justice Rehnquist felt
that the distinction offered by the majority between "truthful" and
"false and misleading" speech was too simplistic." He pointed out the
majority's decision allows pharmacists to disseminate irresponsible
and potentially dangerous advertisements such as, "Can't shake the
flu? Get a prescription for Tetracycline from your doctor today" and
then puts the burden on the government to prove that the statement
was "actually untruthful or misleading."82 His warning against an
"open door" policy that would undermine the "societal interest
against the promotion of drug use for every ill, real or imaginary," 3
presciently forecasted the current controversy over promotion of off-
label drug use.
B. Western States
The next major Supreme Court decision concerning
pharmaceutical-related speech came more than a quarter century
later, in Thompson v. Western States Medical Center.' The source of
controversy was a provision of section 503A of the Act that allowed
pharmacies making compounded drugs to avoid the FDA's new-drug
77. Id. at 780.
78. See id. at 780-81.
79. See id. at 783 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 788.
81. Id. at 787 (internal quotation marks omitted).
82. Id. at 788.
83. Id. at 790.
84. 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
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registration process as long as they refrained from advertising their
compounding services." A compounded drug is a drug tailored to the
needs of an individual patient that is custom-made by specially
trained pharmacists in a small-scale facility.86 Compounding can make
important modifications to existing drugs for patients with particular
needs-for example, turning a pill into a liquid for someone who is
unable to swallow pills-or even create drugs not sold widely by
manufacturers because the intended population is too small.'
Compounding is usually regulated at the local or state level, although
with the FDAMA, the FDA was poised to step in to help oversee the
safety of compounded drugs."
The FDA's rationale for the FDAMA provision at issue in
Western States was to permit the traditional and useful practice of
compounding in local communities to proceed without costly federal
registration, while preventing compounding pharmacies from growing
too big and emulating regular, brand-name manufacturers by selling
drugs in large batches and across disparate geographic areas."
Compounding pharmacies challenged the speech-related provisions
of section 503A on the basis that the pharmacies had a First
Amendment right to disseminate truthful and non-misleading
information about "the use and effectiveness of specific compounded
drugs."'o
In a 5-4 decision, the Court struck down the regulation as an
impermissible imposition on commercial speech.9 1 It applied the
formal, four-part test for commercial speech restrictions that the
85. Id. at 365 ("[T]he Act [required] that they refrain from advertising and promoting
their products if they wish to continue compounding...." (citing Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 127(a), 111 Stat. 2296,
2328 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 353a (2012)) (adding section 503A to the FDCA)).
86. LOYD V. ALLEN, JR., THE ART, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY OF
PHARMACEUTICAL COMPOUNDING 2 (4th ed. 2012).
87. M. Dooms, H. Pinc6 & S. Simoens, Do We Need Authorized Orphan Drugs When
Compounded Medications Are Available?, 38 J. CLINICAL PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS
1, 1-2 (2013) (providing case studies showing how compounded drugs are used to treat
rare diseases).
88. S. REP. No. 105-43, at 67 (1997) (noting that the goal of the statute was to "clarify
the application of the [FDCA] to the professional practice of pharmacist compounding of
drug products").
89. Western States, 535 U.S. at 369 ("The Government also has an important interest,
however, in permitting the continuation of the practice of compounding so that patients
with particular needs may obtain medications suited to those needs. And it would not
make sense to require compounded drugs created to meet the unique needs of individual
patients to undergo the testing required for the new drug approval process.").
90. Id. at 365.
91. Id. at 377.
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Court announced in the 1980 case of Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York,' which
became the framework for evaluating subsequent commercial speech
restrictions. First, was the speech false or misleading, or did it concern
unlawful activity?' If so, the speech deserves no protection.94 Second,
is the government's interest in regulating the speech substantial?"
Third, does the regulation directly and materially advance the
government's interest?" Finally, is the regulation narrowly tailored,
meaning, no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest? 97
Writing for the Western States majority, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor jumped quickly to the balancing-test components of
Central Hudson because the truthfulness of advertisements for
compounding pharmacies was not at issue." Justice O'Connor opined
that the government's stated interest in maintaining the integrity of
the new drug approval system while at the same time permitting
compounding for the needs of individual patients was substantial, and
the scheme restricting advertising was "rationally calculated" and
might indeed directly advance the government's interest in limiting
the scale of compounding." However, she struck down the regulation
as being more extensive than necessary because she believed the
Court's precedent held that "if the Government could achieve its
interests in a manner that does not restrict speech, or that restricts
less speech, the Government must do so."o
Justice O'Connor listed a number of ways that oversight of
compounded pharmacies could be achieved with narrower
92. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Central Hudson involved a challenge to a New York state
energy conservation policy that prevented utility companies from promoting "use of
electricity." Id. at 558 (citation omitted). The Court found the regulation to be
unconstitutional because it also limited promotional activities that provided "information
about electric devices or services that would cause no net increase in total energy use," id.
at 570, while a narrower restriction would support conservation equally well, id. at 570-71.
93. Western States, 535 U.S. at 367 (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566).
94. Id.
95. Id. (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566).
96. Id. (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566).
97. Id. (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566). Central Hudson held that the
energy-conservation policy failed the fourth prong of the test. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at
571. Although the Court recognized the state's important interest in promoting energy
conservation and accepted that the regulation would directly further that interest, it
deemed the regulation unconstitutionally broad because the regulation indiscriminately
restricted all promotional advertisements regardless of their effect on electricity use. Id. at
568-71.
98. See Western States, 535 U.S. at 368.
99. Id. at 371.
100. Id.
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restrictions on speech, such as limiting the amount of compounded
drugs that could be sold or preventing compounding in anticipation of
receiving a prescription.'o Her opinion focused on the fact that there
was "no hint" in the legislative history or briefs as to whether the
government considered these non-speech-restricting possibilities and
made a determination as to why they "would be insufficient to
prevent compounding from occurring on such a scale as to undermine
the new drug approval process."" The general principles she stressed
were that restrictions on speech should be "necessary," not just
"convenient," and that "regulating speech must be a last-not first-
resort."10
Writing in vigorous dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer (joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist) argued that the majority had applied the
Central Hudson test too strictly." He argued that the regulation was
reasonably related to the government's interests and offered the
additional justification that a limit on compounding advertisements
could promote public health goals by limiting prescribing of
compounded drugs inspired by truthful but not necessarily fully
descriptive advertisements. 0o He also evaluated each of the majority's
so-called "less restrictive alternatives" and found them to be
impractical or ineffective. 0 6 Conceding that a blanket ban on
advertising may restrict circulation of some truthful information, he
nonetheless found the regulation proportional to the government's
goals and not deserving of the same close judicial scrutiny that would
attach to regulations of individual self-expression or political
speech.107
The dissent also argued that the Court should avoid interfering in
a "democratically determined governmental decision to regulate a
commercial venture in order to protect ... the public health."os
Invoking the ill-fated Lochner-era interference in economic
legislation, when the Court often struck down economic regulations
based on justices' disagreement with legislative decisions about
commercial policies, they warned that "an overly rigid 'commercial
speech' doctrine will transform what ought to be a legislative or
101. Id. at 372.
102. Id. at 373.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 389 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
105. See id. at 380, 382, 384-85.
106. Id. at 385-86.
107. Id. at 387-88.
108. Id. at 388 (citation omitted).
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regulatory decision about the best way to protect the health and
safety of the American public into a constitutional decision
prohibiting the legislature from enacting necessary protections.' 09
In the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor dismissed the dissent's
concerns about advertising giving rise to inappropriate prescribing.110
She wrote that this goal rested "on the questionable assumption that
doctors would prescribe unnecessary medications.""' Even if that
proved to be the case, she held, the Court's decision in Virginia State
Board firmly established that government may not prevent "the
dissemination of truthful commercial information in order to prevent
members of the public from making bad decisions with the
information."" 2 If the concern was that physicians or the public might
be confused by the advertisements and encouraged to prescribe
compounded drugs inappropriately, such an outcome could be
avoided "by the far less restrictive alternative of requiring each
compounded drug to be labeled with a warning that the drug had not
undergone FDA testing and that its risks were unknown."'13
The Supreme Court thus ruled that the speech-related provisions
were invalid, but it did not address the rest of the Ninth Circuit's
decision, which found that these provisions were not severable from
the rest of the section.114 As a result, in the wake of the Court's
decision, the FDA stated that "all of section 503A is now invalid."'
Compounding pharmacies remained under primarily local or state
control, although the FDA subsequently issued a Compliance Policy
Guide that included some of Justice O'Connor's less restrictive
alternatives intended to prevent them from expanding their reach
outside the official new drug approval system.116
With weaker central regulation and variable local oversight,
many compounding pharmacies grew to a national scale."' In 2012, a
109. Id. at 389.
110. Id. at 373-75 (majority opinion).
111. Id. at 374.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 376.
114. See id. at 377; W. States Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 238 F.3d 1090, 1096-98 (9th Cir.
2001), aff'd sub nom. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
115. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE
FOR FDA STAFF AND INDUSTRY: COMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDES MANUAL § 460.200
PHARMACY COMPOUNDING 2 (2002), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets
/98fr/02d-0242_gdl0001.pdf.
116. See id. at 3.
117. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS, 113TH CONG.,
THE CASE FOR CLARIFYING FDA AUTHORITY: LARGE-SCALE DRUG COMPOUNDING
AND THE ONGOING RISK TO PUBLIC HEALTH 7 (Comm. Print 2013), available at
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public health crisis related to compounded drugs struck as hundreds
of people were sickened and dozens killed from fungal infections
arising from unsafe compounded steroid injections made in a
Massachusetts compounding pharmacy but sold nationwide."' These
compounded drugs were extensively advertised, and they were often
prescribed without supporting evidence of effectiveness."'
C. Sorrell
The next Supreme Court case concerning the relationship
between commercial speech and pharmaceutical promotion arrived
with the Court's 2011 decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.120 The
underlying dispute concerned a Vermont law that restricted the
commercial sale, disclosure, and use of prescribing records revealing
prescribers' identities without their consent and prohibited
pharmaceutical manufacturers and marketers from using that
information for marketing or promotion.12' Though the statute's
prohibitions appeared to relate to transfers of data and not speech, it
was challenged as a violation of the First Amendment's protection of
commercial speech because the Vermont legislature explicitly
intended to rein in pharmaceutical sales representatives' "detailing"
visits to prescribers, in which representatives made use of prescribing
data to customize their marketing presentations to particular
physicians. 2 2 Numerous studies show that pharmaceutical marketing
through personal sales visits to physicians drives prescriptions in favor
of the drugs being promoted, and sales representatives rely heavily on
http://www.help.senate.gov/imo/medialdoc/Senate%20HELP%2OCommittee%2OStaff%2
OReport%20-%20Large-Scale%2ODrug%20Compounding%205%2022%2013.pdf
("Between 2006 and 2012, Ameridose grew rapidly and, by the time of the [New England
Compounding Center]-caused meningitis crisis, Ameridose-compounded drugs were
available to the 3,000 hospital members of Novation, the largest group purchasing
organization in the country, in addition to 22,000 other providers and facilities." (citation
omitted)).
118. See Kevin Outterson, Regulating Compounding Pharmacies after NECC, 367 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1969, 1971 (2012).
119. Federal and State Role in Pharmacy Compounding and Reconstitution: Exploring
the Right Mix to Protect Patients: Statement Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor,
and Pensions, 108th Cong. 38-39 (2003) (statement of Steven K. Galston, Deputy Director
of the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research at the FDA) ("Many compounding
pharmacies have established Internet websites to promote and sell their products.").
120. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
121. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631 (2010), invalidated by Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,
131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011); see also Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2659 (describing the provisions of the
Vermont law).
122. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2663 ("Any doubt that § 4631(d) imposes an aimed, content-
based burden on detailers is dispelled by the record and by formal legislative findings.").
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prescriber-identified prescription data to enhance the effectiveness of
their marketing message.123
In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court struck down the law.124
Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy observed that the
statute was "content- and speaker-based" on its face, applying only to
marketing content and pharmaceutical manufacturers." Further, the
Court found that Vermont had engaged in "viewpoint discrimination"
by targeting the restriction to specific speakers with whose message-
that expensive, branded drugs should be prescribed more often-it
disagreed.126 The Court seemed very troubled by the intent of the
statute to "burden[] disfavored speech by disfavored speakers."127
Justice Kennedy began the majority opinion by considering
whether the statute should be subject to "heightened scrutiny." 128 He
concluded that heightened scrutiny, akin to that provided to
government actions affecting political speech, may be appropriate in
cases of blatant viewpoint discrimination even in the commercial
arena because the "information can save lives." 129 However, Justice
Kennedy ultimately did not evaluate the controversial statute at issue
under the strict-scrutiny framework. Rather, he held that the statute
did not meet even the lesser standard of Central Hudson because the
restriction on the commercial sale of prescriber-identified data was
not narrowly tailored to achieving any of the asserted interests.13 0
Quoting Western States, Justice Kennedy emphasized that "the
'fear that people would make bad decisions if given truthful
information' " cannot justify content-based burdens on speech.13 ' Two
points were of principal importance to Justice Kennedy's reasoning.
First, it was clear from the legislative history that the goal of the
Vermont statute was to stifle speech in order to advance a policy
agenda. 3 2 Second, physicians were sophisticated actors, and "[i]f
pharmaceutical marketing affects treatment decisions, it does so
because doctors find it persuasive."' 33
123. For a review of studies, see Puneet Manchanda & Elisabeth Honka, The Effects
and Role of Direct-to-Physician Marketing in the Pharmaceutical Industry: An Integrative
Review, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 785, 788-808 (2005).
124. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2672.
125. Id. at 2663.
126. Id. (quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992)).
127. Id. at 2663.
128. Id. at 2664.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2668.
131. Id. at 2670 (quoting Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002)).
132. Id. at 2672.
133. Id. at 2670.
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As in Western States, Justice Breyer dissented." He objected to
the majority's seeming creation of a heightened standard of scrutiny
and again invoked the specter of the Court's Lochner era."'s Applying
the Central Hudson test, Justice Breyer found the Vermont statute to
satisfy constitutional standards-particularly the narrow-tailoring
prong of the test-because it imposed only "modest harm" on
commercial speech.13 6 As a counterweight, the statute directly
advanced the state's substantial interest in improving prescribing
practices by focusing sales discussions on drugs' merits rather than a
prescriber's prescribing habits.' Finally, he pointed out that the
majority could not point to an "adequately supported," more
narrowly tailored regulation that would achieve the same benefits.3 8
Notwithstanding Justice Breyer's disagreement, the Sorrell
decision signaled that judicial unwillingness to countenance
government restrictions on commercial speech had reached a new
level. However, it remains unclear whether the nebulous "heightened
scrutiny" standard suggested by the Sorrell majority is intended to put
content- and speaker-based commercial speech restrictions on the
same constitutional footing as limitations on non-commercial speech.
It is an inherent characteristic of many, if not most, commercial
speech regulations that only some speakers are restricted and that the
restriction pertains to particular content."' Therefore, applying this
principle would seem to elevate review of all commercial speech
limitations to the non-commercial-speech plateau, an outcome that
the Sorrell Court could hardly have intended. More likely, the Sorrell
decision represents a move to implement a more stringent application
of the Central Hudson test to restrictions on commercial speech that
target a class of speakers expressing a particular viewpoint. Yet even
this outcome represents a plain intensification of the judicial scrutiny
applied to commercial-speech restrictions.140
134. See id. at 2673 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Western States, 535 U.S. at 378 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
135. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2679 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 2680, 2684.
137. Id. at 2682.
138. Id. at 2683.
139. Michelle M. Mello & Noah A. Messing, Restrictions on the Use of Prescribing
Data for Drug Promotion, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1248, 1252 (2011).
140. The implications of this decision for the FDA's off-label marketing regulatory
scheme are unmistakable. See John N. Joseph et al., Is Sorrell the Death Knell for FDA's
Off-Label Marketing Restrictions?, 5 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 1, 27 (2012) ("A fair
reading of the Sorrell decision arguably presents serious hurdles to FDA's ban on off-label
marketing, even under Central Hudson's intermediate standard of. First Amendment
scrutiny of commercial speech restrictions.").
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D. Summary
Several thematic threads connect the Supreme Court's decisions
in the trio of cases concerning prescription-drug-related speech. First,
it is clear that governmental restrictions on truthful statements about
pharmaceuticals will be judged under an elevated level of scrutiny
that is at least as stringent as the Central Hudson test, and perhaps
higher. Sorrell opens up the door to evaluating such restrictions under
an even more rigorous "heightened scrutiny" if they implicate
discrimination against a particular viewpoint and suggests that many
commercial-speech restrictions will be categorized as viewpoint
discrimination.
Second, in the pharmaceutical market as in other markets, the
Court has been very suspicious of restrictions on commercial speech
that smack of "paternalism," or a governmental attempt to keep
consumers in the dark for what the legislature has determined to be
their own good. This perspective is seen in the Virginia State Board
opinion where the majority expressed the goal of supporting
consumers' ability to comparison shop among pharmacies based on
price.14 ' In Western States and Sorrell, the Court was concerned with
supporting physician decision making by ensuring access to
information about compounded drugs and informational meetings
with pharmaceutical sales representatives. In each case, paternalistic
incursions by government were characterized as blocking consumers'
or physicians' ability to receive and weigh potentially useful, truthful
information: the Court spoke of low-income patients who need to
comparison shop among pharmacies,'42 pediatricians unaware of "a
new development in compounding" allowing new administration of a
previously unavailable drug,'43 and "some Vermont doctors" who
enjoy receiving targeted detailing.'"
The Court found the government's paternalistic overtures
especially objectionable when they were directed at physicians, who it
viewed as "sophisticated and experienced" consumers highly capable
of performing a critical weighing of information provided by
141. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
763 (1976). "These figures eloquently suggest the diminished capacity of the aged for the
kind of active comparison shopping that a ban on advertising makes necessary or
desirable." Id. at 764 n.18.
142. Id. at 764 n.18.
143. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 377 (2002).
144. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671 (2011).
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pharmaceutical manufacturers and their marketing representatives.145
For example, in Western States, Justice O'Connor rejected the
"questionable assumption that doctors would prescribe unnecessary
medications" as a rationale for finding advertising restrictions on
compounded drugs improper. 146 Similarly, in Sorrell, Justice Kennedy
stressed that antipaternalism concerns attached "with full force"
because of the listeners' sophistication. 147
Third, each Court decision emphasizes the trope of the
"marketplace of ideas." Commercial-speech rights are characterized
as supporting a vigorous exchange of ideas in the free market, leading
to optimal economic decision making. In Virginia State Board, the
majority opinion cited the "free flow" of commercial information as
"indispensable" to ensuring that public economic decisions are
intelligent and well-informed. 148 In Sorrell, the Court quoted a
Vermont physician's belief that "information is power" and that more
information leads to better decisions in medicine. 149 The principle that
information is not "in itself harmful" motivated the Court in each
case to strike down a restriction that somehow limits the contribution
of pharmaceutical promotional information.so Further, the Court did
not examine whether the marketplace of ideas actually functions well,
except insofar as it judges that the market's functioning would be
worse in a world where pharmaceutical-related speech is restricted.
Embedded within this affection for the marketplace-of-ideas
concept is a fourth commonality: a presumption that the information
at issue is true and, therefore, useful. Although Justice Stewart in his
Virginia State Board concurrence would have restricted the
commercial speech protection to empirically verifiable information,'
the majority opinion required only that the information be "truthful
145. Id. at 2658 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 775 (1993) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
146. Western States, 535 U.S. at 374.
147. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2671.
148. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765
(1976) ("To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.").
149. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2671 ("As one Vermont physician put it: 'We have a saying in
medicine, information is power. And the more you know, or anyone knows, the better
decisions can be made.' " (quoting Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Joint Appendix I at
279, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (No. 10-779), 2011 WL 687134, at
*279)).
150. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2671; Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770 ("That
alternative is to assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that people will
perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best
means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close them.").
151. Id. at 780-81 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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and legitimate." 5 2 In all three cases, beyond announcing a cursory
conclusion that the information conveyed in the commercial speech is
not false or misleading, the Court declined to evaluate the quality of
the information. 153
III. COMMERCIAL-SPEECH CHALLENGES TO OFF-LABEL
MARKETING
The steady expansion of judicial protection of commercial speech
in the context of pharmaceuticals and other fields has collided with
ramped-up federal enforcement of off-label marketing rules in the
past decade. In the face of enforcement actions that have led to
massive settlements, 54 some companies have evidently been
encouraged by jurisprudential trends to challenge the FDA's
prohibition on communications about the use of drugs for non-FDA
approved indications. These challenges, culminating most notably in
the recent Caronia decision, have chipped away at the FDA's ability
to regulate off-label promotion.
One earlier example of such a challenge stemmed from a 2009
government investigation of the drug manufacturer AllerganI5 s
regarding onabotulinumtoxinA (Botox), a purified neurotoxin
approved for therapeutic use in rare neuromuscular disorders of the
eye and neck muscles and excessive underarm sweating
(hyperhidrosis). 5 6 The Department of Justice investigated charges
that Allergan promoted the drug for numerous other medical
conditions ranging from bladder dysfunction to myofascial pain to
certain types of headache without clear evidence at the time of
efficacy in any of these conditions.'57 In response, Allergan initiated a
lawsuit seeking a preliminary injunction that would find the labeling
152. Id. at 772 n.24 (majority opinion).
153. Of course, the Court's lack of attention to this detail has arisen in part because the
government did not contest the quality of the information either in Sorrell or Caronia.
154. Michelle M. Mello, David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, Shifting Terrain in
the Regulation of Off-Label Promotion of Pharmaceuticals, 360 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1557,
1561-62 (2009).
155. Complaint at 1, United States ex rel. Lang v. Allergan, Inc., No. 1:07-CV-1288
(N.D. Ga. June 5, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/opaldocuments/lang-rushin-
complaint.pdf.
156. See generally John P. Ney & Kevin R. Joseph, Neurologic Uses of Botulinum
Neurotoxin Type A, 3 NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISEASE & TREATMENT 785 (2007)
(summarizing clinical uses of the drug).
157. Complaint, supra note 155, at 54 ("Squillacote told Dr. Lang that another
physician in Mississippi, Dr. Terry Millette, was using one of the covered codes (i.e., ICD-
9-CM code 723.5 for 'torticollis unspecified') for Botox injections treating myofascial pain,
and Squillacote emphasized that 'Dr. Millette is getting paid for it.' ").
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sections of the FDCA and the FDA's prohibitions on off-label
advertising in the Code of Federal Regulations unconstitutional
under the First Amendment as they applied to communications from
Allergan discussing unapproved uses of Botox.58 However, in 2010,
Allergan pleaded guilty to illegal off-label marketing and agreed to
settle the case by paying $600 million in criminal and civil finesl59 and
dropping its lawsuit as part of a five-year corporate integrity
agreement with the federal government."
Similar circumstances arose in the case of Par Pharmaceuticals, a
drug manufacturer that came under scrutiny from the Department of
Justice for off-label marketing of its appetite-stimulating estrogen
derivative, Megace ES. 161 The company allegedly promoted the drug
to physicians caring for geriatric patients and cancer patients despite
the fact that it had only been approved for use in HIV-positive
patients with AIDS-related wasting syndrome.162 In 2011, Par
Pharmaceuticals filed a lawsuit claiming it had a First Amendment
right to engage in off-label marketing of Megace ES, even though the
drug had not been rigorously tested in non-HIV populations and had
been associated with serious risks in clinical trials, including deep vein
thrombosis, diabetes, and adrenal suppression.163 Before its First
Amendment claims could move ahead, though, the company
abandoned the case, settling criminal and civil charges related to
illegal off-label marketing for $45 million in March 2013.'"
158. Complaint at 2, Allergan, Inc. v. United States, No. 1:09-cv-01879 (D.D.C. Oct. 1,
2009), 2009 WL 3187592.
159. Settlement Agreement at 5-7, Allergan, 1:07-cv-1288-WSD (N.D. Ga. Aug. 18,
2010), available at http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/cc/final-settlement09OllO.pdf.
160. Natasha Singer, Maker of Botox Settles Inquiry on Off-Label Use: Unapproved
Therapies, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2010, at Al ("Allergan has also entered into a five-year
corporate integrity agreement with the government under which the company will be
required to publish information about its payments to doctors. The agreement also
required Allergan to drop its First Amendment lawsuit against the F.D.A., in which it had
claimed free speech protections when giving doctors information about unapproved uses
of Botox.").
161. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 1-2, United States ex rel. Doe v. Par
Pharm. Cos., No. 08-3624-SRC (D.N.J. June 25, 2012), available at http://
whistleblowerlegal.com/3-4.pdf.
162. Id. at 5 ("[T]heir sales goals are to flip a percentage of the LTC [long term care]
business regardless of whether there are any HIV or indicated cancer patients.").
163. Id. at 8 ("In presenting to nursing staffs and dietitians in LTC facilities, questions
arise regarding potential risks to the geriatric patient population, such as, for example,
deep vein thrombosis, diabetes, and adrenal suppression (which are among the known and
reported potential adverse effects of Megace ES).").
164. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Par Pharmaceuticals
Pleads Guilty and Agrees to Pay $45 Million to Resolve Civil and Criminal Allegations
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The first challenge to reach a court decision was the Caronia
case, perhaps because it was initiated by a pharmaceutical sales
representative, rather than a pharmaceutical company, and involved a
criminal conviction.165 Alfred Caronia, a sales representative for the
brand-name drug company Orphan Medical, was assigned to promote
the drug sodium oxybate (Xyrem) to physicians.'" Sodium oxybate-
also known as gamma hydroxybutyrate (GHB), a chemical that when
used for recreational purposes has been associated with drug-assisted
sexual assault-was approved by the FDA in 2002 for use in the rare
clinical condition of narcolepsy with severe cataplexy, a condition
marked by sudden onset of lethargy, sleepiness, and full loss of
muscle tone.167 Xyrem's approval was based on two randomized,
controlled -trials involving approximately 200 patients with the
condition.1" According to a sales representative who later initiated a
qui tam action against the company, after a year of modest sales for
the intended use, the company decided to start promoting the drug
off-label to grow revenue and position for a lucrative acquisition.169
To do so, Orphan Medical encouraged sales representatives to
suggest alternative, non-FDA-approved uses for the product; to
organize continuing medical education events featuring physicians
known to prescribe the drug for off-label uses; and to market the drug
using these tactics to physicians (such as geriatricians and
pediatricians) who would not likely see patients with narcolepsy. 17 0
Caronia was one of Orphan Medical's sales representatives at the
time the Department of Justice started investigating the company for
possible off-label marketing." At the office of a target physician who
Related to Off-Label Marketing (Mar. 5, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa
/pr/2013/March/13-civ-270.html.
165. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2012). Caronia, as an
individual pharmaceutical sales representative facing a misdemeanor conviction, was in a
better position to follow through on his case to a jury decision (and appeal) than a
corporation such as Allergan or Orphan Medical, which would more likely be risk averse
and settle for a financial penalty facing the possibility of substantially greater damages at
trial and potentially exclusion from Medicare.
166. Id.
167. Xyrem (sodium oxybate) Oral Solution, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (May 2002),
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda docs/label/2002/211961bl.pdf.
168. Id. at 5 ("The effectiveness of sodium oxybate as an anti-cataplectic agent was
established in 2 randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled trials (Trials 1 and 2) in
patients with narcolepsy, 85% and 80%, respectively, of whom were also being treated
with [Central Nervous System] stimulants.").
169. Second Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 3-4, United States ex
rel. Lauterbach v. Orphan Med. Inc., No. 05-CV-0387-SJF-KAM (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2006).
170. Id. at 3, 19, 25-26.
171. See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 156.
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was wearing a wire, Caronia was recorded suggesting, unprompted,
that sodium oxybate was effective for a constellation of conditions
including insomnia, fibromyalgia, restless leg syndrome, chronic pain,
Parkinson's disease, and multiple sclerosis. 7 2 He also claimed that the
drug could safely be used in elderly and pediatric patients despite
clear statements on the FDA-approved labeling that the drug had not
been tested in those populations.'73 Along with his employer and a
psychiatrist expert that the company had hired to facilitate the
scheme, Caronia was prosecuted for conspiracy to introduce a
misbranded drug into interstate commerce.174
In 2007, the manufacturer pled guilty to introducing a
misbranded drug into interstate commerce with intent to defraud and
mislead and paid criminal and civil fines of about $27 million.'
However, unlike the Allergan and Par Pharmaceutical cases, the
litigation continued because Caronia did not enter a plea. Instead, the
government took him to trial, claiming that his communications were
part of a conspiracy that effectively misbranded sodium oxybate
because it was not FDA-approved for the purposes he discussed."17
The district court reviewed the First Amendment implications of
Caronia's conviction under the Central Hudson test."' It considered
the government's interest to be substantial in "subjecting off-label
uses of a drug or medical device to the FDA's evaluation process"
and found that a restriction on off-label promotion directly served
those interests. 78 The district court pinned the constitutionality of the
FDA's regulatory regime to the final Central Hudson criterion:
whether the regime was more extensive than necessary to meet the
government's legitimate interest.179 It concluded that "constraining
the marketing options of manufacturers is one of the 'few
172. Id.
173. See id. at 155-57.
174. Id. at 157. This charge is a misdemeanor under 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 333(a)(1)
(2012).
175. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice U.S. Attorney's Office, E. Dist. N.Y., Jazz
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Agrees to Pay $20 Million to Resolve Criminal and Civil Allegations
in "Off-label" Marketing Investigation (July 13, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov
/usao/nye/pr/2007/2007jull3a.html.
176. See United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 389-90 (E.D.N.Y. 2008),
vacated and remanded, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
177. Id. at 396-403. As we will discuss in Part IV.B, the conclusion that Caronia's
speech was even within the realm of the Central Hudson test was a controversial one, hotly
contested by the dissent in the appeal to the Second Circuit. Speech that is used as
evidence of intent to commit a crime is not protected by the First Amendment. See
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993); Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 394.
178. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 398.
179. Id. at 399.
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mechanisms available' to the FDA to ensure that manufacturers will
not seek approval only for certain limited uses of drugs, then promote
that same drug for off-label uses, effectively circumventing the FDA's
new drug requirements."1 0 The district court concluded that it could
not identify non-speech restrictions that would serve the same
purpose of "ensuring the integrity of the new drug approval process
while allowing patients to continue to have unfettered access to new
and potentially life-saving uses for drugs and devices approved only
for other purposes."'"' The district court, therefore, favored the
rationale that restrictions on off-label promotion incentivized
production of quality information about pharmaceutical products.182
Caronia appealed the district court's determination that the off-
label promotion rules were allowable under the First Amendment,
arguing that the government could not criminalize his speech.183
"[T]he First Amendment does not," he claimed, "permit the
government to prohibit and criminalize a pharmaceutical
manufacturer's truthful and non-misleading promotion of an FDA-
approved drug to physicians for off-label use where such use is not
itself illegal and others are permitted to engage in such speech."1"
The government responded that it had merely used his speech as
evidence of his (and the company's) intent concerning how they
wanted physicians to use the drug, citing precedent establishing the
permissibility of such use in criminal prosecutions.8 8 A showing that
they intended the drug to be used in unapproved ways-which were,
of course, not described on the drug's labeling-would establish that
the drug's labeling was inadequate, and thus that it was misbranded.'86
On December 3, 2012, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit overturned Caronia's conviction.187 Writing for the majority in
a 2-1 split, Judge Denny Chin held that criminally prosecuting a
180. Id. at 401 (quoting Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 72 (D.D.C.
1998), judgment vacated in part sub. nom. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331
(D.C. Cir. 2000)).
181. Id. at 401.
182. Id.
183. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2012).
184. Id. at 160.
185. Brief and Special Appendix for United States at 53, Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (No.
09-5006-cr(L)), 2010 WL 6351497. The government cited Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S.
476, 489 (1993), in which a unanimous Supreme Court determined that "[tlhe First
Amendment ... does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements
of a crime or to prove motive or intent." Brief and Special Appendix for the United States,
supra, at 53 (quoting Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 489).
186. See Brief and Special Appendix for United States, supra note 185, at 55-56.
187. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 152.
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pharmaceutical sales representative for conspiring to misbrand a drug
by promoting off-label uses violated the representative's First
Amendment right to free speech."'8 The three-judge panel accepted
Caronia's view that he was being prosecuted for his speech, rejecting
the government's alternative frame that the speech was merely used
as evidence of intent and the prosecution that was based on his
conduct.189 In support of this conclusion, the court pointed to several
factors: (1) the government repeatedly argued in its summation and
rebuttal at trial that Caronia engaged in criminal conduct by
promoting off-label uses of Xyrem; (2) during the trial, the
government did not limit its use of Caronia's speech to proving intent;
(3) the government never suggested that Caronia engaged in any
conduct constituting misbranding other than his promotional
statements (for example, by placing deficient labeling on the drug);
and (4) the district court's jury instructions communicated to the jury
that Caronia's speech itself was the illegal conduct.190
Judge Chin's opinion drew heavily from the Sorrell decision.19'
Following Sorrell, he found that the speech restriction was both
content- and speaker-specific: the FDA regulations targeted only off-
label promotion, as opposed to all promotion, and applied only to
drugmakers, as opposed to all speakers."2 Consequently, the court
held that the restriction constituted viewpoint discrimination,
triggering heightened judicial scrutiny.' 93 As in Sorrell, the Caronia
majority declined to state what level of scrutiny should be applied-
the Central Hudson test or stricter scrutiny-and disposed of the case
188. Id. at 169.
189. Id. at 160-62. Judge Chin's majority opinion strongly criticizes the way the
government framed Caronia's prosecution, including the closing argument and the jury
instructions. For example, he quotes the "jury charge" at length to show that it relied
solely on Caronia's promotional speech, rather than his conduct. Id. at 159. Future
prosecutors in this area may learn from this decision to frame their cases better. See infra
Part IV.A; see also, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 27, Scruggs v. United States,
714 F.3d 258 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 336 (2013) (No. 13-206), 2013 U.S. S. Ct.
Brief LEXIS 3349, at *41 ("The Second Circuit struck down the conviction, holding that
the prosecutor's overt focus on the promotional speech itself, as if it were the actus reus of
the crime, gave rise to First Amendment concerns."); Brief for the Respondents in
Opposition at 23, Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th
Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Am. Snuff v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1996 (2013) (No.
12-521), 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1641, at *41 ("holding prosecution erroneously
rested on theory that promotional acts were themselves unlawful").
190. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 161.
191. See, e.g., id. at 165 (citing various parts of Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct.
2653 (2011)).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 165; see Mello & Messing, supra note 139, at 1250 (discussing the
"heightened scrutiny" standard).
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by concluding that even under the lower of the two possible
standards, the speech restriction failed. 9 4
In applying the Central Hudson test, Judge Chin first averred
that the speech at issue in this case was not false or misleading
because the government, in presenting its case, had not tried to paint
Caronia's statements as such.' 95 "Of course," Judge Chin wrote, "off-
label promotion that is false or misleading is not entitled to First
Amendment protection."'96 But since the government did not argue
this claim at trial, Judge Chin did not engage the issue. Judge Chin
also quickly agreed that the government had substantial interests at
stake, which he identified as "preserving the efficacy and integrity of
the FDA's drug approval process and reducing patient exposure to
unsafe and ineffective drugs."' 97
The Second Circuit's decision turned on Central Hudson's final
two factors-whether the off-label promotion rules directly advance
the government's interests and whether they are broader than
necessary.198 Judge Chin ruled that restricting off-label drug
promotion failed on both points.'" First, the restriction on off-label
promotion did not directly advance the government's interest in
reducing unsafe drug use because it "prohibits the free flow of
information that would inform" the legal practice of off-label use.200
Rather than advancing patient safety, "paternalistically" interfering
with information dissemination about legal uses of a drug inhibited
"informed and intelligent treatment decisions."2 01 Judge Chin
emphasized that physicians were a skilled and sophisticated audience,
and it was their-not the government's-role to determine which
information was useful.202 Caronia's promotional information helped
them do so, serving the public interest by ensuring "that decisions
194. See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 168-69 (rejecting the government's arguments); see also
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 189, at 27 (considering political speech to
require "much stricter scrutiny" than the standard applied in Caronia); Brief for Pharm.
Research & Mfrs. of Am. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Applicants at 19, Caldwell ex rel.
State v. Janssen Pharm., No. 2012-C-2447 (La. 2014), 2013 LA S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 57, at
*34 (using Sorrell and Caronia to argue that "speaker-based discrimination is subject to
'heightened scrutiny' ").
195. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 165.
196. Id. at 165 n.10 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
197. Id. at 166.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 167-68.
200. Id. at 167.
201. Id. at 166 (citation omitted).
202. Id. (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670 (2011)).
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about the use of prescription drugs, including off-label usage, are
intelligent and well-informed." 203
Second, the court held that restricting manufacturers' off-label
promotion was too broad an intervention because other options could
achieve the same goal without inhibiting speech. 21 The court
proposed that the government could educate physicians and patients
about how to distinguish between "misleading and false promotion,
exaggerations and embellishments, and truthful or non-misleading
information," require disclaimers for off-label uses, limit the number
of off-label prescriptions a physician may write, or warn physicians
and manufacturers about their potential exposure to malpractice
claims from adverse outcomes resulting from off-label treatment
decisions.205
Caronia's conviction was rejected over a dissent from Judge
Debra Ann Livingston, who argued that the majority opinion "calls
into question the very foundations of our century-old system of drug
regulation."2 06 She argued that the regulations were not about
restricting speech, crediting the government's argument that
Caronia's speech was merely being used as evidence of his intent to
engage in misbranding.207 She criticized the majority for departing
from judicial precedent allowing the use of speech for purposes of
establishing intent in criminal cases.208
Turning to the Central Hudson test, she found that the
restrictions on off-label promotion were pivotal to the FDA's
rigorous pre-market approval process, a cornerstone of the agency's
strategy to protect the public from unsafe and nonefficacious drugs.209
Without them, she argued, companies' incentive to establish the
203. Id. at 167. This language in particular raised the ire of the dissent and led to Judge
Livingston's concern about undermining the FDCA. See infra note 206, 209-11 and
accompanying text.
204. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 167-68.
205. Id. at 168.
206. Id. at 169 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 172.
208. Id. at 175 (citing cases relating to employment discrimination); id. at 176 (quoting
the D.C. Circuit's conclusion in Whitaker v. Thompson, 353 F.3d 947, 953 (D.C. Cir. 2004),
that "it is constitutionally permissible for the FDA to use speech, in the form of labeling,
to infer intent for purposes of determining that [the plaintiff's] proposed sale of saw
palmetto extract would constitute the forbidden sale of an unapproved drug"). Further,
Judge Livingston noted, words themselves may constitutionally serve as the basis of some
crimes. Id. at 175 (listing the crimes of attempt, conspiracy, and inducement as examples);
id. at 175 n.5 (citing cases involving insider trading laws, antitrust laws, and laws
prohibiting unlicensed laypersons from dispensing legal and medical advice).
209. Id. at 177-78.
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safety and efficacy of new drug uses and obtain FDA approval for
them would be undermined.2 10 The majority's position would allow
"any substance that may be legally sold for some purpose [to] be
promoted by its manufacturer for any purpose-so long as the
manufacturer's statements are merely unsubstantiated, rather than
demonstrably false or misleading." 2 11 Judge Livingston also found no
defect in the tailoring of the speech restriction.2 12 She rejected as
inadequate, impractical, or otherwise undesirable the majority's
proffered alternative policies.21 3
Though the three-judge decision could have been subject to
review by the full Second Circuit (as well as the Supreme Court), the
FDA announced in January that it would not appeal.2 14 The FDA
averred that Caronia would not "significantly affect the agency's
enforcement of the drug-misbranding provisions of the Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act," as it "does not strike down any provision of
the ... act or its implementing regulations, nor does it find a conflict
between the act's misbranding provisions and the First Amendment
or call into question the validity of the act's drug approval
framework."215 While the FDA's characterization of the scope of the
opinion is correct-the Caronia court barred a particular avenue of
criminal prosecution, rather than striking down any statutory or
regulatory provision per se-its conclusion that its enforcement
efforts will not be hampered is rather mystifying.2 16 As Judge
210. Id. at 178.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 177.
213. See id. at 179-80 (arguing that measures such as funding physician educational
programs and imposing disclaimers are unlikely to be effective in addressing the problems
created by off-label promotion).
214. Thomas W. Burton, FDA Won't Appeal Free-Speech Marketing Decision, WALL
ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2013, 8:20 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887
324539304578260323575925896.
215. David Sell, U.S. Won't Pursue Case of Drug Representative and 'Off-Label'
Promotion, PHILA. INQUIRER (Jan. 26, 2013), http://articles.philly.com/2013-01-
26/business/36550335_1_drug-companies-fda-misbranded-drug.
216. Notably, two off-label marketing cases have since settled in the Second Circuit,
suggesting that Caronia certainly does not absolutely bar such cases being brought
forward, even in that circuit. The first, in December 2012, involved Amgen pleading guilty
to the charge that it "illegally sold [Aranesp, Enbrel, and Neulastal with the intention that
it be used at off-label doses that the FDA had specifically considered and rejected, and for
an off-label treatment that the FDA had never approved" and agreeing to pay $762
million in civil and criminal fines. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Amgen Inc. Pleads
Guilty to Federal Charge in Brooklyn, NY.; Pays $762 Million to Resolve Criminal
Liability and False Claims Act Allegations (Dec. 19, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2012/December/12-civ-1523.html. The second, in May 2013,
involved an anti-inflammatory ophthalmologic drop made by ISTA Pharmaceuticals
1572 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92
Livingston pointed out in her dissent, it is hard to see how the
majority's reasoning would ever allow promotional statements about
off-label uses of drugs to be used to support a conviction for
misbranding.217
The decision not to appeal may have been more of a strategic
calculation than a genuine conclusion that its effects will be minimal.
With the Supreme Court and courts of appeals showing consistently
strong support for commercial-speech rights, it is a treacherous time
to pursue such an appeal. The outcome of an appeal could be the
expansion of the Second Circuit panel's holding to the national stage.
Even absent appeal in Caronia, the Second Circuit's ruling may
be tested. Targets of off-label promotion prosecutions may appeal in
other circuits218 or within the Second Circuit based on different facts.
It is therefore worthwhile to consider both the merits of the Caronia
ruling and what avenues it leaves open to the FDA to regulate off-
label promotion in the future.
IV. THE FUTURE OF REGULATIONS RESTRICTING OFF-LABEL
PROMOTION
The Caronia decision has been hailed by advocates of expanded
commercial speech rights for the pharmaceutical and medical device
industries.219 These commentators have argued that the FDA's
approved for use in post-cataract pain but promoted widely for other pain relief
indications related to the front of the eye as well as medical conditions in the back of the
eye. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, ISTA Pharmaceuticals Inc. Pleads Guilty to
Federal Felony Charges; Will Pay $33.5 Million to Resolve Criminal Liability and False
Claims Act Allegations (May 24, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr
/2013/May/13-civ-606.html. ISTA pled guilty and agreed to $33.5 million in fines and
exclusion from the federal health care programs. Id. Bausch+Lomb, which had recently
acquired ISTA, agreed to institute a wide-ranging corporate integrity program. Id. It is
likely, however, that these settlements were in the final planning stages long before the
Caronia decision was issued, so we expect the impact of that decision to be felt much more
acutely in the future.
217. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 172 (Livingston, J., dissenting). Commentators have also
taken the view that Caronia portends a dim future for FDA prosecution of off-label
promotion. See, e.g., Christopher Robertson, When Truth Cannot Be Presumed: The
Regulation of Drug Promotion Under an Expanding First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV.
545 (2014) (calling the decision "a severe blow" for the FDA's regulatory regime); John T.
Bentivoglio et al., How Caronia Could Reshape Government Investigations, LAW360.COM
(Jan. 2, 2013, 12:32 PM), http://www.1aw360.comlhealth/articles/403767/how-caronia-
could-reshape-govemmentinvestigations ("The government's theory of off-label liability
deployed for so long and so prominently as part of settlements rather than in litigation,
now has been rejected by an appellate court.").
218. See infra note 235.
219. See, e.g., Ralph F. Hall, Professor of Practice, Univ. of Minn. Law Sch., 1st
Amendment Cases: Our Most Important Judicial Trend, Presentation to Food and Drug
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restrictions on off-label promotion are too broad because they cover
potentially truthful speech about off-label uses and because those off-
label uses are lawful and can be clinically indicated.220 They claim the
combination of these factors "prevents promotion of valuable off-
label uses of which doctors otherwise may well be unaware. "221
Advocates of this position also point to unfair "asymmetry" in the
marketplace, in which parties other than the manufacturers are able
to discuss these uses, including insurers, unaffiliated drug information
vendors, and other physicians.222
However, the Caronia decision marks another setback (following
on Sorrell) in the government's effort to limit dangerous public health
outcomes from non-evidence-based industry marketing, and it adds
another signal that the courts are intensifying their protection of
commercial speech.2 23 The Caronia court's application of the Supreme
Court's line of commercial speech cases raises the question of what
avenues remain for government regulation of the pharmaceutical
Law Institute Advertising and Promotion for the Pharmaceutical, Medical Device,
Biological, and Veterinary Medicine Industries 6 (Sept. 17, 2013) (unpublished slideshow),
available at http://www.fdli.org/docs/ap2013-slides/top-20-combined-final.pdf?sfvrsn=
(pointing to the Caronia decision as part of the "most important judicial issue of our
generation"); see also Respondent's Brief at 31, Coleman v. Medtronic Corp., 223 Cal.
App. 4th (2014) (No. B243609), 2013 CA App. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2784, at *52 (arguing that
the FDA can no longer prohibit off-label promotion after Caronia since "deriving an
indirect prohibition on off-label promotion from the FDCA's misbranding provision is
precisely the position that was rejected in Caronia").
220. See Coleen Klasmeier & Martin H. Redish, Off-Label Prescription Advertising, the
FDA and the First Amendment: A Study in the Values of Commercial Speech Protection,
37 AM. J.L. & MED. 315, 316, 344 (2011) (calling FDA regulation of off-label speech
"paternalistic manipulation of consumer behavior"). Klasmeier and Redish go further to
argue that the Central Hudson test is no longer applicable to pharmaceutical promotional
speech but that "the Court would today apply a categorical standard which automatically
invalidates suppression of truthful expression that advocates lawful consumer behavior."
Id. at 344; see also Gregory Conko, Hidden Truth: The Perils and Protection of Off-Label
Drug and Medical Device Promotion, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 149, 154-55 (2011) (citing a
survey and American Medical Association position statement indicating that physicians
believe the FDA has made it more difficult for them to learn about new uses for drugs and
devices and that it should not regulate off-label promotion).
221. Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 220, at 316.
222. Tevi D. Troy, Senior Fellow, Hudson Inst., CER, FDA, and the Free Speech
Challenge, Presentation at the National Pharmaceutical Council Conference: Asymmetry
in the Ability to Communicate CER Findings (Feb. 9, 2012), available at
http://www.npcnow.org/system/files/conferences/download/ttroy-asyml2.pdf (calling out
"unfair restrictions").
223. See Brief for Appellants at 28, Caldwell ex rel. State v. Janssen Pharm., No. 2012-
C-2447 (La. 2014) (considering Caronia as standing for the proposition that "promotion
that 'is not in and of itself false or misleading' cannot constitutionally be punished merely
because it conveys information not authorized in FDA-approved labeling" (quoting
United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149,165 (2d Cir. 2012)).
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manufacturers' off-label promotional speech. We can see five ways
forward for the FDA. The first three involve seizing on key technical
issues invoked in the Caronia case: (1) ensuring that prosecutions are
based on written rather than oral statements; (2) emphasizing that
speech is being used as evidence of intent; and (3) focusing on the
false or misleading nature of the promotional materials. In addition,
in defending its policies against future claims of commercial speech
infringement, the FDA could make a stronger case that its regulations
meet the criteria of the Central Hudson test, with the principles
enumerated by the Supreme Court in its prior pharmaceutical
promotion cases in mind. Finally, the FDA could reconfigure its
regulatory regime to adapt its restrictions on commercial speech in
ways that still permit oversight of public safety.
A. Prosecutions Based on Written Statements
In stating its belief that Caronia would not significantly affect its
ability to prosecute misbranding,224 the FDA may have envisioned
that it would rely more heavily on written materials as evidence in the
future.225 Printed materials produced by the drug manufacturer, such
as brochures and PowerPoint slides that a sales representative would
show during an office visit to a physician or the materials that a
company's medical affairs office would send in response to a
physician's direct inquiry about a potential off-label use, could be
considered part of the labeling of a drug. Consequently, if these
materials included statements about unapproved uses, this would
constitute direct evidence of intent to misbrand the drug. By contrast,
in Caronia, the government made no claim that Caronia's oral
statements were part of the drug labeling.
This avenue of prosecution is clearly viable from a legal
perspective. It is of limited practical utility, however, as any company
with a competent compliance program will avoid making
impermissible statements about off-label uses in printed materials,
particularly those that could be considered part of the drug's labeling.
224. See Sell, supra note 215 and accompanying text.
225. A similar suggestion is made in Hyman, Phelps & McNamara, P.C., A Deep Dive
into the Second Circuit's Caronia Decision, Potential Next Steps, and Potential Enforcement
Fallout, FDA LAW BLOG (Dec. 12, 2012, 1:37 AM), http://www.fdalawblog.net
/fdalaw..blog.hyman-phelps/2012/12/a-deep-dive-into-the-second-circuits-caronia-
decision-potential-next-steps-and-potential-enforcement.html ("We wonder if we will see
FDA shift its focus to the 'unapproved new drug' charge to support off-label promotion
cases against pharmaceutical manufacturers .... This shift would require evidence of
labeling containing the drug's new intended use.").
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B. Speech as Evidence of Intent
The government could seek to work within the confines of the
Caronia decision by framing its future prosecutions so as to avoid a
finding that it is prosecuting individuals because of their speech. The
holding in Caronia turned on the majority's determination that the
government was prosecuting Caronia for his speech, rather than
merely using his speech as evidence of his intent to misbrand.226 Judge
Livingston dedicated the first half of her dissenting opinion to
disputing this finding.2  Both sides agreed that there was a real and
constitutionally significant distinction between the two ways of using
speech in a misbranding prosecution.
This raises the question whether the government might have
prevailed against Caronia's First Amendment claim if prosecutors
had chosen their words more carefully in arguing the case.2 28 If So, it
would be an absurd outcome: the same conduct should not be eligible
or ineligible for criminal prosecution depending simply on how it is
described in court.229 Yet it may offer an avenue for distinguishing
Caronia's prosecution from future prosecutions for misbranding.
FDA regulations make clear that the intended use of a drug, for
purposes of making out a misbranding claim, may be established by
reference to "the objective intent of the persons legally responsible
for the labeling of drugs." 230 This may be shown through "oral or
written statements by such persons or their representatives." 231 The
Caronia majority assumed, without expressly deciding, that the
government could "offer evidence of a defendant's off-label
promotion to prove a drug's intended use and, thus, mislabeling for
that intended use," citing precedent in support of this view.232
226. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2012).
227. Id. at 169-77 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
228. See Kesselheim, Mello & Avorn, supra note 21, at 446; Allen Rostron,
Pragmatism, Paternalism, and the Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech, 37 VT.
L. REv. 527, 562 (2013).
229. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 19, Ring v. United States, 134 S. Ct.
175 (2013) (No. 12-1462), 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2667, at *31 ("[T]he line between
criminalizing speech and permitting speech to be used as proof of intent is illusory, leading
to disparate results in cases like ... Caronia ... where intent is an essential element of the
crime.").
230. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 154 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 201.128 (2012)).
231. Id. (quoting 21 C.F.R § 201.128 (2012)).
232. Id. at 161 (citing Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993); Whitaker v.
Thompson, 353 F.3d 947, 953 (D.C. Cir. 2004)); see also Caronia, at 172 (Livingston, J.,
dissenting) (stressing that these same precedents do clearly establish that the First
Amendment does not preclude the use of speech as evidence to prove the elements of a
crime); id. at 174-75 (discussing several additional precedents concerning the same point).
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The court faulted the government, however, for failing to
circumscribe its use of Caronia's statements in this way.233 It noted
that the government repeatedly referred to his promotional
statements as the criminal conduct itself and did not argue that he
engaged in any conduct constituting misbranding other than the oral
statements (such as conspiracy to place deficient labeling on the
drug). 234 The majority and dissenting opinions both suggested the
court may have taken a different view of the applicability of First
Amendment protection had the prosecutors emphasized that
Caronia's promotional statements were being offered merely as proof
that he intended the drug to be used for purposes not described in the
labeling.
In future prosecutions, the government could be sure to
emphasize the combination of promotional statements by sales
representatives and other available evidence of intent-for example,
training practices that encourage sales representatives to promote off-
label uses and documentary evidence of a company's interest in
promoting off-label uses235-to establish intent to misbrand.
However, we are skeptical that the constitutional objections raised
against off-label promotion rules in Caronia would be remedied
merely by a change in prosecutorial language. For example, in Sorrell,
the State of Vermont tried to defend its data-mining statute by
arguing that the statute was being applied in such a way as to promote
an interest in preserving the privacy of physician-identified
prescription information.23 6 Ultimately, however, the majority
decision was unmoved by this change in linguistic approach and
struck down the statute anyway because it found that the rules
applied content- and speaker-based restrictions without appropriate
justification.23 7 In the context of Caronia, it may be hard for changes
The Whitaker case, though it does not emanate from the Supreme Court, is particularly
relevant. There, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the First
Amendment did not protect the plaintiffs right to label saw palmetto extract with a drug
claim about an unapproved use. Whitaker v. Thompson, 353 F.3d 947, 953 (D.C. Cir.
2004).
233. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 161-62.
234. Id.
235. See Ed Silverman, Off-Label Marketing: Free Speech or Illegal Promotion?, 346
BMJ f320, f320 (2013).
236. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2682 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
("Vermont compiled a substantial legislative record to corroborate this line of
reasoning.").
237. See id. at 2662 (majority opinion) ("At oral argument ... the State for the first
time advanced an alternative reading of § 4631(d)-namely, that pharmacies, health
insurers, and similar entities may not sell prescriber-identifying information for any
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in prosecutorial language to move a sufficiently motivated judge to
look beyond the FDA's off-label marketing rules.
C. Off-Label Promotion As False or Misleading Speech
A third possibility for the government to avoid the reach of
commercial speech protections in enforcing its off-label promotion
rules is to prosecute off-label promotion as false or misleading
speech.238 The Supreme Court and lower courts have consistently
stressed that commercial-speech protection under the First
Amendment is limited to speech that is truthful and nonmisleading.239
Cases of false and misleading speech have been successfully
prosecuted under the misbranding provisions of the FDCA. For
example, in the 2008 case of United States v. Caputo,24 the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit adjudicated a dispute regarding
promotional statements made by two principals of a small medical
device company called AbTox, which made a medical instrument
sterilizing device called the Plazlyte.241 The FDA had cleared AbTox's
application for a small-volume Plazlyte, 42 but expressly limited its
purpose, subject to the statutory exceptions set out at § 4631(e) .... In any event,
§ 4631(d) cannot be sustained even under the interpretation the State now adopts.").
238. See Silverman, supra note 235, at f321 (speculating that the government will now
"focus only on those cases where [it] can prove that false or misleading information was
knowingly conveyed to healthcare providers"); Bentivoglio, supra note 217 (predicting the
same); Katie Thomas, Ruling Is Victory for Drug Companies in Promoting Medicine for
Other Uses, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2012), http:// www.nytimes.com/2012/12/04
/business/ruling-backs-drug-industry-on-off-label-marketing.html (same); see also
Kesselheim, Mello & Avorn, supra note 21, at 446 (suggesting that this is a prosecutorial
avenue left open by Caronia); Robertson, supra note 217, at 565 ("[Tjhe courts should
decline to presume truthfulness, and decline to presume that [off-label promotional]
claims are shielded by the First Amendment as protected commercial speech.").
239. See Appellant's Reply Brief at 21, Coleman v. Medtronic, Inc., 223 Cal. App. 4th
413 (2014) (No. B243609), 2013 WL 4050440, at *21 (arguing against defendant's
contention that Caronia held that there was no federal prohibition against off-label
promotion by stating that "the court essentially adopted a narrowing construction of the
law so that it does not criminalize truthful speech").
240. 517 F.3d 935 (7th Cir. 2008).
241. Id. at 937-38.
242. 510(k) Premarket Notification: Plazlyte(TM), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec.
22, 1994), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpmn/pmn.cfm?ID=K905119.
Clearance for the small-volume Plazlyte came under the FDA's 510(k) pathway for review
of medical devices that allows moderate-risk devices to be marketed based on a proof of
substantial equivalence to prior-approved devices. See id.; Premarket Notification (510k),
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 3, 2014), http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices
/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice/PremarketSubmissions/Prema
rketNotification5l0k/default.htm. For the FDA's purposes, substantial equivalence can be
adequately demonstrated without the need to conduct studies of the performance of the
device; indeed, a manufacturer needs to demonstrate only substantial equivalence to a
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clearance for use with stainless-steel instruments. Since such a
limitation would have restricted the product's marketing potential,
AbTox started offering for sale a large-volume Plazlyte (previously
available only outside the United States) and promoting its use for
general-purpose sterilization. 243 The controversy arose because the
large-volume Plazlyte left a dangerous residue on brass instruments
used in ophthalmologic surgery, leading to blindness in some
patients.2" In the ensuing criminal prosecution, AbTox's directors
offered a First Amendment defense for their actions, claiming a
commercial speech right to talk about off-label uses of their device.245
However, the Seventh Circuit rejected this defense on the basis that
AbTox lied to the FDA when seeking approval for the small-volume
Plazlyte, and the large-volume Plazlyte could not lawfully be sold in
the United States.246 As a result, the speech of the AbTox directors
was false and concerned unlawful activity. It was not protected as
commercial speech.247
The Caputo case is an extreme example of false and misleading
speech relating to medical products. A more familiar scenario
occurred in the recent case of United States v. Harkonen.24 8 The chief
executive officer of the drug manufacturer InterMune, W. Scott
Harkonen, was indicted for felony misbranding and wire fraud
relating to his promotion of the immunomodulating drug interferon
gamma-lb (Actimmune) as a treatment for idiopathic pulmonary
fibrosis (IPF), a fatal lung inflammatory disease.2 49 The controversy
revolved around a 2002 company-sponsored clinical trial that showed
that the drug was not effective in treating IPF based on the primary
endpoints of the trial.250 Harkonen ordered a post-hoc analysis of the
device that had previously been cleared. See Premarket Notification (510k), supra.
According to the Seventh Circuit, the FDA was wary of Plazlyte's safety and instructed
the company that if it wanted approval of a larger device for use in a wider range of
instruments, the company would have to submit under the Premarket Approval pathway
reserved for high-risk devices, which requires submission of considerable data from safety
and effectiveness testing. See Caputo, 517 F.3d at 937.
243. Caputo, 517 F.3d at 937.
244. Id. at 938.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 940 (describing the jury's findings); id. at 944 (affirming the district court).
247. Id. at 940 ("Unless the machine itself could be sold lawfully, there were no lawful
off-label uses to promote.").
248. No. C 08-00164 MHP, 2010 WL 2985257 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2010).
249. Id. at *1.
250. According to the court records, the trial failed on the primary endpoint of disease-
progression-free survival as well as all nine predetermined secondary endpoints. See Joe
Barber, US Court Set to Rule on Former Intermune CEO Free-Speech Case, FIRSTWORD
PHARMA (Dec. 6, 2012),
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data. According to later testimony at trial, Harkonen said he would
"cut that data and slice it until [he] got the kind of results [he was]
looking for,"251 and indeed he did-he found that patients in the
"mild to moderate" subgroup of IPF showed improvement in survival
in the active treatment arm compared to placebo (5% versus 16%).52
FDA medical officers informally reviewed the clinical-trial data and
stated that they did not believe it would support the use of
Actimmune for IPF.23 Nonetheless, twelve days later, Harkonen
organized a press release that claimed a "survival benefit" and said
the drug "reduces mortality by 70% in patients with mild to moderate
disease." 254 InterMune followed up this press release with other
promotional materials regarding Actimmune's purported survival
benefit, and Harkonen instructed his company's sales representatives
to disseminate these materials to physicians."
Sales of the drug increased nearly fivefold over the next three
years due to increased use among IPF patients. 25 6 Of course, post-hoc
subgroup analyses are controversial analytic tools because they
generate multiple comparisons that raise the likelihood of finding
erroneous statistical significance and may not adjust for imbalances
across subgroups. 257 A follow-up study organized by InterMune
http://www.firstwordpharma.com/node/1039261?tsid=17#axzz2sPO45jJn; Thomas M.
Burton, Courts to Weigh Free Speech Rights in Pharmaceutical Marketing Cases, WALL ST.
J. (Dec. 5, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732331680
4578161601385027858. However, one of those secondary endpoints was overall survival,
and there the drug showed a slight difference from placebo (10% mortality versus 17%
mortality in the placebo arm) that was not statistically significant (p=0.08). David Brown,
The Press-Release Conviction of a Biotech CEO and Its Impact on Scientific Research,
WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/the-
press-release-crime-of-a-biotech-ceo-and-its-impact-on-scientific-
research/2013/09/23/9b4ala32-007a-11e3-9a3e-916de805f65dstory.html.
251. United States v. Harkonen, 510 F. App'x 633, 636 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, Harkonen v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 824 (2013).
252. The difference appeared to be highly significant (p=0.004). Brown, supra note 250.
However, because Intermune did not account for testing multiplicity in arriving at this p-
value, the p-value was not very meaningful. See infra note 257 and accompanying text.
253. Brown, supra note 250.
254. Press Release, InterMune, InterMune Announces Phase III Data Demonstrating
Survival Benefit of Actimmune in IPF (Aug. 28, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov
/Archives/edgar/data/1087432/000091205702033878/a2088367zex-99_1.htm.
255. Complaint at 6-7, United States ex rel. Gallagher v. InterMune, Inc., No. 04:CV-
4323 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 2004), available at http://www.drugepi.org/downloads/downloads
/Intermune_.Complaintl.pdf.
256. Id. at 8 ("During the period 2001 through 2004, InterMune's sales of Actimmune
grew from $35 million in 2001 to more than $140 million in 2003.... In 2003, 96.5% of
InterMune's sales of Actimmune were for off-label uses, primarily for treatment of IPF.").
257. See Kirkwood F. Adams, Post Hoc Subgroup Analysis and the Truth of a Clinical
Trial, 136 AM. HEART J. 753 (1998).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
sought to evaluate the efficacy of Actimmune in the mild- to
moderate-disease subgroup.258 The trial, which involved 826 patients
in 81 centers across the world, showed no survival difference between
patients receiving the drug and placebo (15% versus 13% mortality)
and was prematurely stopped.259 That study was published in 2009.21
Harkonen fought his prosecution by claiming that his speech was
a protected opinion under the First Amendment because it was
"scientific speech about 'medical practices in fields where knowledge
has not yet been crystallized' " and "where there exists 'no exact
standard of absolute truth.' "261 The government replied that the free-
speech argument was meant to distract from the fraudulent nature of
his statements and emphasized that "neither the government nor the
FDCA seeks to make criminal good-faith scientific debate." 26 2 The
government's tactic in the Harkonen case, as distinct from the
Caronia case, was to argue that it was not "seeking to restrict truthful,
non-misleading promotion of the off-label uses of Actimmune" or
regulate anyone's "ability to engage in a discourse on whether
Actimmune might someday prove beneficial as a treatment for
IPF."263 Rather, it was prosecuting Harkonen because his speech was
fraudulent.2 6
Siding with the government, the district court opined that
Harkonen's statements should not be analyzed as opinions about a
contested scientific matter, but as fraudulent speech.265 Since it was
"undisputed that the government has the right to regulate false and
misleading statements made to doctors and patients about drug
products in interstate commerce,"266 the proper arbiter for the dispute
over Harkonen's statements was a jury.
Harkonen argued to the jury that he genuinely believed his
interpretation of the Actimmune trial data, and that at worst his press
release constituted advertising "puffery," not fraud.267 However,
having examined an extensive record that showed substantial
258. See Talmadge E. King Jr. et al., Effect of Interferon Gamma-lb on Survival in
Patients with Idiopathic Pulmonary Fibrosis (INSPIRE): A Multicentre, Randomised,
Placebo-Controlled Trial, 374 LANCET 222, 222 (2009).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. United States v. Harkonen, No. C 08-00164 MHP, 2009 WL 1578712, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. June 4, 2009) (quoting Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1949)).
262. Id.
263. Id. at *8.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
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evidence that Harkonen knowingly employed improper tactics and
strategies in promoting Actimmune, the jury convicted him of wire
fraud.21 He was sentenced to three years' probation and assessed a
$20,000 fine. 269 Harkonen appealed his conviction, but in March 2013
was rebuffed.270 In a relatively brief decision that did not recapitulate
Harkonen's First Amendment claims, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
jury's finding of intentional fraud as reasonable.27 1
The Harkonen case thus illustrates one potential path for future
government prosecution of off-label promotion: arguing that a
pharmaceutical company representative is being prosecuted "not
because he promoted [a drug] for an unapproved use ... but because
he made knowingly false and misleading statements in doing so."272
For many statements that sales representatives make to promote off-
label uses, the government could make a reasonable argument that
the speech qualifies as misleading and deceptive. Among well-trained
sales representatives, the tactic of communicating "non-demonstrably
false information," to use Judge Livingston's term,273 is probably
common-and arguably deceptive. Most off-label uses of drugs have
little or no scientific support,274 but sales representatives may omit
that material fact or misrepresent the strength of evidence.275
The existence of such behaviors has been supported by
numerous published reports from pharmaceutical sales
representatives. For example, psychiatrist Daniel Carlat, acting as a
representative on behalf of a Wyeth antidepressant, addressed a
physician's concern about a dangerous side effect of the drug
268. United States v. Harkonen, 510 F. App'x 633, 635 (9th Cir. 2013) (describing the
lower court result). The jury's decision to acquit Harkonen on the misbranding charge is
puzzling in light of its decision to convict him of wire fraud. See United States v.
Harkonen, No. C 08-00164 MHP, 2010 WL 2985257, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2010).
269. Harkonen, 510 F. App'x at 635.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 635-39. Harkonen filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. See
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Harkonen, 510 F. App'x. 633 (No. 13-180), 2013 WL
4027035. In December 2013, the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Harkonen, 510 F.
App'x 633, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 824 (2013); see Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Supreme Court
Refuses to Hear Ex-InterMune CEO's Appeal, REUTERS (Dec. 16, 2013, 2:52 PM),
http://www.trust.org/item/20131216143706-v9uq8.
272. Harkonen, 2009 WL 1578712, at *6 (quotation omitted).
273. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 181 (2d Cir. 2012) (Livingston, J.,
dissenting).
274. See Radley, Finkelstein & Stafford, supra note 39, at 1023.
275. Cf Robertson, supra note 217, at 566 (pointing out that drug sales representatives
receive a contingent payment for every unit sold, creating "biases that likely skew the
advice given").
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(hypertension) by downplaying its significance. 276 He later reflected,
"I knew I had not lied-I had reported the data exactly as they were
reported in the paper. But still, I had spun the results of the study in
the most positive way possible, and I had not talked about the
limitations of the data."277 Another ex-pharmaceutical sales
representative also reported, "[E]very word, every courtesy, every
gift, and every piece of information provided is carefully crafted, not
to assist doctors or patients, but to increase market share for targeted
drugs."m2  These are not isolated instances. Manufacturers have for
decades provided inadequate information to enhance the sales of
their products by boosting the drugs' efficacy and downplaying their
side effects for unapproved uses.279  Another strategy is the
publication of partial data, leading to a publication that is true on its
face but leaves out critical information that may undermine
conclusions about its utility.280 Numerous other factors contribute to
marketed products having inaccurate risk-benefit profiles for off-label
uses.281
276. Daniel Carlat, Dr. Drug Rep., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com
/2007/11/25/magazine/25memoir-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
277. Id.
278. Adriane Fugh-Berman & Shahram Ahari, Following the Script: How Drug Reps
Make Friends and Influence Doctors, 4 PLOS MED. 621, 625 (2007).
279. See JEREMY A. GREENE, PRESCRIBING BY NUMBERS: DRUGS AND THE
DEFINITION OF DISEASE (2007).
280. See Joanna K. Sax, Protecting Scientific Integrity: The Commercial Speech Doctrine
Applied to Industry Publications, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 203, 208 (2011). Sax describes a
hypothetical case study in which a pharmaceutical company has twelve months of data but
publishes only six because the beneficial effect noted at six months becomes non-
significant at the later time point. Id. Sax concludes that
the publication may be accurate or truthful with respect to the data gathered at the
six-month time-point, but the publication gives a false impression, via omission,
that no other data was collected or that no other data exists to provide support for
a contrary conclusion. Plus, the public, politicians, scientists, and clinicians have
almost no way to confirm or deny the data.
Id. This hypothetical is based on a real case: the nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug and
selective COX-2 inhibitor, celecoxib (Celebrex). See Katie Thomas, In Documents on Pain
Drug, Signs of Doubt and Deception, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com
12012/06/25/health/in-documents-on-pain-drug-celebrex-signs-of-doubt-and-deception
.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
281. Efthimios Parasidis, Patients over Politics: Addressing Legislative Failure in the
Regulation of Medical Products, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 929, 975 ("Notably, the health risks
posed by the current regulatory system are exacerbated by tactics employed by industry in
the course of product research and development. These techniques, many of which have
come into the public domain through litigation, undermine the claim that the current
regulatory framework provides adequate safeguards."). See generally THE RISKS OF
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS (Donald W. Light ed., 2010) (describing strategies used to promote
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In this light, making conclusory, unsubstantiated claims of safety
and efficacy for unapproved uses without reference to supporting
evidence might reasonably be characterized as misleading. The FDA
has pursued such an enforcement strategy in past cases involving
unsubstantiated claims and minimization of risks in the context of off-
label promotion,282 and it is consistent with the agency's prior
interpretations of the meaning of misleading speech.283
This approach has a few clear disadvantages, however.
Establishing that off-label promotional statements are false or
misleading requires, first, evidence in the record as to the specific
words used by the defendant. Not all off-label promotion cases
involve the pristine evidence available to the government in the
Caronia case because of the willingness of a cooperating physician to
audiotape conversations.
Second, even if the nature of the promotional statements can be
clearly established, the government must prove that they are false or
misleading, which requires a case-by-case evaluation.28' The boundary
line between protected speech and false speech in the area of off-
label promotion is unclear and likely to be heavily contested if the
government pursues this strategy. Few cases will be as clear-cut as
Caputo's, which involved a completely unapproved product,28 5 or
inaccurate perceptions that overstate the benefits and underestimate the risks of many
approved prescription drugs).
282. For example, the FDA issued warning letters to Forest Laboratories concerning
oral statements made by its sales representatives in promoting two of its drugs, Savella and
Daliresp, for off-label uses. Marc J. Scheineson & Guillermo Cuevas, United States v.
Caronia: The Increasing Strength of Commercial Free Speech and Potential New Emphasis
on Classifying Off-Label Promotion as "False and Misleading," 68 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
201, 213-14 (2013).
283. Id. at 214.
284. See Robertson, supra note 217, at 559. "The many different claims that drug
representatives make about a drug each raise distinct empirical questions. These claims
are unlike the representations made in other domains, where the truthfulness is 'easily
verifiable.'" Id. (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 645
(1985)). Robertson proposes that courts shift the presumption so that the truthfulness of
off-label promotional statements must be affirmatively shown, arguing that the truth or
falsity of such claims is "unknown, largely because the drugmaker has declined to invest in
making such a proof" by conducting the trials necessary to demonstrate the drug's effects.
Id. at 575. This is a sensible suggestion, but one that seems unlikely to find traction. One
reason is that it might mean the end of off-label promotion, since a manufacturer would
have to "spend the time and money to prove to the FDA the truth of its promotional
claims" before making them. Id. at 573. Depending on the level of proof required, the
burden could be so heavy that the manufacturer either ceases making off-label claims or,
having conducted the studies necessary to prove them, simply seeks FDA approval for the
off-label use.
285. United States v. Caputo, 517 F.3d 935, 937-38 (7th Cir. 2008).
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Harkonen's, whose patently false speech did not "trench anywhere
near the outer bounds of speech deemed controversial." 2 86
Third, the precise boundaries of this realm of speech, and what is
required to establish that particular speech lies within them, are
somewhat unclear. Though the Central Hudson test has been often
described as excluding "unlawful or false or misleading" speech from
protection, in actuality the Central Hudson opinion used different
words, holding that the government may freely ban forms of
commercial communication "more likely to deceive the public than to
inform it" or that "do not accurately inform the public about lawful
activity."2 7 In other commercial-speech cases, the Supreme Court has
described commercial speech unworthy of First Amendment
protection as being "misleading, deceptive, or aggressive."2 88
Unfortunately, in the past three decades, no judicial opinion in a
commercial-speech case has taken up the call from the Stewart
concurrence in Virginia State Board to better define the level of proof
required to distinguish between misleading and truthful promotion.28 9
In the absence of "smoking gun" evidence that the speaker knew
the statements to be false, establishing that promotional speech is
false or misleading will require assessing the strength, validity, and
appropriateness of evidence for each claim. This will require a
considerable amount of complex expert testimony and pose heavy
cognitive demands on lay jurors.290 In light of these challenges, the
misleading-speech strategy for prosecuting off-label promotion will
be useful only in a narrow range of cases. Though an awareness that
the FDA might pursue such an approach could motivate companies
to take stronger steps to ensure that their representatives avoid the
worst excesses of off-label promotion, because of the limitations of
this approach, we next explore two broader alternatives.
D. Taking Another Run at the Central Hudson Hurdle
A fourth potential strategy for the FDA is simply to continue to
prosecute off-label promotion on the theory that its regulatory
approach satisfies the Central Hudson test notwithstanding the
286. United States v. Harkonen, No. C 08-00164 MHP, 2009 WL 1578712, at *6 (N.D.
Cal. June 3, 2009).
287. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv., 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
288. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996).
289. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 780-
81 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring).
290. See Silverman, supra note 235, at f320 (predicting "haggling ... over which
activities, literature, and statements constitute false or misleading information" and
"increased argument" over "complicated and intricate statistics").
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Caronia decision. That is, the government could take the position that
restricting off-label marketing is a proper exercise of government
power even if it is not technically false or misleading. The reasoning
in Caronia is vulnerable enough to criticism that the FDA might
prevail under such a theory in other jurisdictions and thus be able to
maintain its existing regulatory approach in most of the country.
This strategy would address a troubling potential effect of the
Caronia rule: the decision appears to pave the way for medical
product companies to conduct poor-quality studies for the purpose of
showing products' utility for unapproved indications. 291 There is no
need for companies to design these studies to meet the FDA's
standards for methodological rigor if the companies have no intention
of submitting an application for approval of the new use but rather
intend to use the study findings only in marketing communications.
Companies can design studies in ways that maximize the chances of
obtaining a desired result and select which studies to emphasize in
promotional communications, ignoring others that do not support
their promotional message.29 Caronia provides a fertile ground for
such practices to grow by effectively erecting a First Amendment
bulwark around the communications, so long as they do not rise to
the level of false and misleading speech. Thus, the regulatory
framework established by the Caronia decision is worth resisting.
To build a strong case for the permissibility of its regulatory
approach to off-label promotion under the Central Hudson test, the
government will need to respond to judicial pronouncements on each
291. Kesselheim, Mello & Avorn, supra note 21, at 446.
292. There is an extensive record demonstrating that funding of trials by the
pharmaceutical industry leads to results that favor the financial interests of the company
sponsoring the trial. For a brief review, see Christopher Robertson, Susannah Rose &
Aaron S. Kesselheim, Effect of Financial Relationships on the Behaviors of Health Care
Professionals: A Review of the Evidence, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 452 (2012). Alternative
solutions have been proposed "to allow industry support of science without allowing
undue influence," such as a blinded intermediary between funding sources and the
scientists who design and run the trial. Christopher T. Robertson, The Money Blind: How
to Stop Industry Bias in Biomedical Science, Without Violating the First Amendment, 37
AM. J.L. & MED. 358, 373 (2011). Robertson describes an alternative reality in which
[t]he funder would provide to the intermediary the product for testing and
designate a testable hypothesis (i.e., that the product will be safe andlor effective
for some specified clinical indication). The intermediary would then determine
how much money would be necessary to properly test that hypothesis, and require
such payment in advance.
Id. Such proposals might help reduce the likelihood of bias, but they would not prevent
funders from proposing self-serving scientific studies in the first place or from cherry-
picking the ones favorable to them for use in their promotional materials.
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of the three main prongs: (1) substantiality of the government
interest; (2) direct advancement; and (3) narrow tailoring. We discuss
each in turn.
1. Substantial Government Interest
The first Central Hudson principle is whether the government
interest that the regulation is intended to serve is substantial. All
courts that have reviewed restrictions on pharmaceutical promotion
have agreed that the government has offered some substantial
interest, sufficient to satisfy this criterion, but not every interest
claimed by the government has been accepted as substantial.293
Attention to this criterion is important because how the government
interests at issue are described will affect the rest of the balancing
test. The broader the interests that courts accept as legitimate
justifications for restricting off-label promotion, the broader the
government's latitude will be in designing the regulatory scheme.
Courts have resisted governmental attempts to frame a
substantial interest in preventing off-label promotion from reaching
physicians. For example, in Washington Legal Foundation v.
Friedman, the district court accepted the government's assertion of a
substantial interest in "providing manufacturers with ample incentive
to get previously unapproved uses on label" but rejected the
government's contention that it also had a substantial interest in
"ensuring that physicians receive accurate and unbiased information
so that they may make informed prescription choices."2 94 "To the
extent that the FDA is endeavoring to keep information from
physicians out of concern that they will misuse that information," the
court wrote, "the regulation is wholly and completely
unsupportable." 2 95 The government's attempt to reassert this interest
in Caronia296 was largely ignored by the majority opinion, which
293. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71-73 (1983) (finding a
government interest in protecting postal patrons from offensive but not obscene materials
did not qualify as substantial).
294. Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 69 (D.D.C. 1998), judgment
vacated in part sub. nom. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
295. Id.
296. In its brief, the government wrote,
Unlike Sorrell, this is not a case in which the government is animated by "fear that
people would make bad decisions if given truthful information." The promotion of
unapproved uses involves representations of safety and efficacy that are
scientifically unproven and potentially false, and physicians and patients who rely
on those representations may do so to the detriment of the patients' health and
even their lives.
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focused on the interests in safeguarding the integrity of the drug-
approval system and reducing patient exposure to unsafe and
ineffective drugs.297
Notwithstanding the district court's holding in Washington Legal
Foundation and the strong anti-paternalism of the Caronia opinion, it
is worth pressing the government's interest in ensuring that physicians
receive accurate, unbiased information to support informed treatment
choices as substantial in future cases. Prevailing on this point is likely
to require more concerted effort to persuade courts of three realities
about off-label communications. First, even when they do not rise to
the level of what courts would define as false or misleading, off-label
promotional statements may fall well short of accurate, unbiased
information. It will be difficult to make this case for some forms of
off-label communication, such as dissemination of articles from
reputable, peer-reviewed journals. But, as the transcripts from
Caronia's conversation with the cooperating physician show, oral
conversations in the confines of physician offices have fewer
mechanisms of accountability.2 98 It is not unreasonable to argue that
the government has a substantial interest in preventing the
communication of unsubstantiated information in such settings and to
Supplemental Brief for United States at 10, United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir.
2012) (No. 09-5006-cr(L)) (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2658
(2011)), available at http://www.hpm.com/pdf/blog/US%20Caronia%2OSupp%20Brief.pdf.
297. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 166.
298. See id. at 156-57. Indeed, the Washington Legal Foundation court's reasoning in
rejecting the government's asserted interest has much more applicability to
communications about off-label uses made in journal articles or other written forms than
to oral communications from sales representatives. See Wash. Legal Found., 13 F. Supp. 2d
at 69-70. The court had in mind companies' efforts to distribute "scientific research
product[s]" such as "an article... in the New England Journal of Medicine," textbook
reprints, and continuing medical education presentations. Id. at 70. The court judged
physicians clearly capable of evaluating the credibility of scientific claims in these media.
Id. It may have had in mind the fact that written communications can be scrutinized,
digested, and verified at the physician's leisure. It may also have in mind the other
mechanisms of accountability that inhere in the publication process. For journal articles
and book chapters, the involvement of editors and peer reviewers and the venue of
publication provide physicians with markers of the scientific rigor and importance of a set
of study findings. The semi-public nature of continuing medical education presentations,
the memorialization of presentations in written form (such as slides), and the attestations
that presenters are required to make all provide incentives for speakers to avoid
unsubstantiated claims. The Washington Legal Foundation court was not asked to, and did
not, consider the very different circumstances surrounding private conversations between
sales representatives and physicians during physician-office visits. See Mello, Studdert &
Brennan, supra note 154, at 1557-58 (discussing the degree of transparency around
different forms of off-label promotion).
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push back on courts' seemingly consistent assumption that off-label
communications are always wholly accurate.
Second, courts have had greater confidence than is warranted in
physicians' ability to evaluate claims about off-label uses. When
promotional claims are made without the representative offering
supporting evidence, such as published study findings, the
impossibility of critically evaluating the credibility of the claims is
obvious. Physicians must rely on their judgments of representatives'
personal credibility. Some promotional claims may be inherently
impossible for physicians to verify, such as a claim that other
physicians are already widely prescribing the drug for a particular off-
label use and have encountered no serious safety problems.
Third, even when a journal article or other document supporting
a claim about the safety or effectiveness of an off-label use is offered,
it may convey only a slice of the full empirical picture. There may be
countervailing study findings or important study limitations that were
omitted from the write-up in the article. The FDA approval process
serves as a bulwark against such problems by deploying highly skilled
scientists to analyze all of the available information about a drug's
use, verify analyses conducted by the drug's sponsor independently,
and scrutinize the design of the studies offered to support the new
use. Individual physicians cannot approach this level of evaluation;
even if they had the time and inclination to explore the veracity of
claims made in off-label promotional communications, they lack
access to the information necessary to do so thoroughly.2 99 These
same considerations led Congress to require drug manufacturers to
submit proof of efficacy to the FDA prior to marketing,30 and they
299. Kesselheim, Mello & Avorn, supra note 21, at 446 ("[lIt is not 'paternalistic' to
recognize the obstacles that prevent physicians from [sorting through marketing claims
and making sound decisions on their own] when it comes to off-label prescribing. FDA
approval involves numerous highly skilled scientists reviewing a great deal of data for
months. It is not possible for individual prescribers to conduct the same rigorous
evaluation, even if such data are available to them (which they often are not) or to expect
that sales representatives' presentations will effectively meet this need.").
300. See Waxman, supra note 10, at 306-07. In a particularly trenchant anecdote, U.S.
Representative Henry Waxman recalled that
the Secretary of the Department of Health Education and Welfare (HEW)
testified in 1962 [that] it is meaningless to say that a physician should have the
right to decide for himself whether a drug is effective, unless "truthful and
complete information" about the effectiveness of a drug is available to any
physician in the ordinary course of practice. The marketplace as it existed before
there was an effectiveness requirement provided neither. For most physicians,
"truthful" information was impossible to separate from misleading information,
and "complete information" almost was never available.
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apply with equal force to off-label promotional statements fifty years
later.
For these reasons, it is worthwhile for the government to
continue to assert an interest in imposing reasonable restrictions on
off-label communications for the purpose of ensuring that the
information communicated to physicians is accurate and unbiased. It
is a reasonable, and non-paternalistic, exercise of government power
to encourage the private creation of new, high quality information
about drugs that could then be communicated fully without
restriction once it appeared on the drugs' labeling. It should also, of
course, assert the other interests that courts have had less difficulty
accepting as substantial, such as protecting the integrity of the drug
approval process and protecting the public from unsafe prescribing.3 01
2. Direct Advancement
The second component of a reinvigorated defense of restrictions
on off-label promotion under Central Hudson is establishing that the
regulation directly advances the asserted government interest(s). 302 A
three-pronged argument is needed to overcome this hurdle to
regulation.
First, the government should underscore the ways in which
unfettered off-label promotion destabilizes its long-accepted drug-
approval system. Judge Livingston argued this position in her
dissenting opinion in Caronia,303 and the argument has considerable
force. If companies are free to promote their products for any use or
any population, once the product has been approved for one use or
population, their incentive to invest in the clinical studies required to
Id. at 307 (citation omitted).
301. Cf Robertson, supra note 217, at 565 ("[E]xpenditures on marketing are zero
sum; they simply redistribute wealth. Expenditures on research are, on the other hand,
positive sum, creating greater welfare. Without such a requirement that manufacturers
prove efficacy and safety prior to promotion, that proof will not be secured, and zero-sum
marketing predominates. The epistemic and economic motive for the FDCA, tying
investments to market rewards, is much different than the paternalistic one caricatured by
the courts and commentators."). A recent review bolsters the case for the government
interest in avoiding unsafe prescribing by compiling a number of studies showing a
statistical association between physicians' exposure to pharmaceutical company
promotional information and lower quality of prescribing decisions, though it also
references several studies that did not detect such an association. See Geoffrey K. Spurling
et al., Information from Pharmaceutical Companies and the Quality, Quantity, and Cost of
Physicians' Prescribing: A Systematic Review, 7 PLoS MED. e1000352 (2010).
302. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
303. See supra text accompanying notes 210-11.
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secure FDA approval for new uses is dramatically undercut. A world
in which off-label promotion is unregulated is likely to be one in
which poorly substantiated marketing claims about unapproved uses
proliferate,3" with attendant effects on prescribing decisions and
patients' health and safety. It is hard to overstate the public health
importance of this point. Promotional statements strongly drive
prescribing behavior in ways that do not match evidence-based
practice guidelines or the medical literature, and they have been
empirically demonstrated to lead to use of targeted prescriptions
increases after sales representative visits as well as increases in
requests by physicians to add drugs to their hospital formularies.3 05
The literature is clear that there is a strong, consistent, specific, and
independent association between physician prescribing and exposure
to pharmaceutical marketing messages.
Second, the government must address the Caronia majority's
assertion that there is a logical inconsistency between the decision not
to prohibit off-label prescribing and the FDA's attempt to regulate
promotion of off-label uses.306 If prescribing is to be allowed, the
majority reasoned, it should be as informed as possible, and
obstructing the free flow of information about off-label uses works
against this goal.307
As with most of the majority's reasoning, this argument is
premised on the unchallenged assumption that off-label promotional
communications are sufficiently accurate and unbiased to support
"intelligent and well-informed" decision making. 08 Because there is
reason to doubt this assumption, based on decades of experience with
off-label promotion, regulating off-label promotional communications
is by no means incompatible with the decision to permit off-label
prescribing. To the contrary, the government has a strong interest in
seeing that promotional communications are accurate and unbiased
304. Kesselheim, Mello & Avorn, supra note 21, at 446 ("Because costly products
would carry the highest incentive for such activity, evidence-poor prescribing would result
in runaway costs.").
305. See, e.g., Jerry Avorn, Milton Chen & Robert Hartley, Scientific Versus
Commercial Sources of Influence on the Prescribing Behavior of Physicians, 73 AM. J.
MED. 4, 6 (1982); Mary-Margaret Chren & C. Seth Landefeld, Physicians' Behavior and
Their Interactions with Drug Companies: A Controlled Study of Physicians Who Requested
Additions to a Hospital Drug Formulary, 271 JAMA 684, 688 (1994).
306. See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 7, Am. Snuff Co. v. United States, 133 S. Ct.
1996 (2013) (No. 12-521), 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1764, at *7 ("Where, however,
FDA regulates speech about products that may otherwise be lawfully sold, the First
Amendment applies with full force.").
307. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 167 (2d Cir. 2012).
308. Id.
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to ensure that physicians make clinically sound prescribing decisions.
For this reason, there is a strong argument that some regulation of
off-label promotion-though not all forms, and certainly not a
blanket prohibition on off-label communication-would meet the
direct-advancement criterion.
In the context of this argument, it is worth recalling that the
FDA's current regulatory approach does not impose a blanket
prohibition on off-label promotion, but instead focuses on those
forms of communication that are most amenable to corruption.30 9
Unprompted oral communications from sales representatives in the
personal confines of a physician's office, such as the tactics at issue in
the Caronia case, are not permitted.310 In contrast, peer-reviewed
journal articles and independent continuing medical education
programs are permitted to discuss off-label uses, and manufacturers
can respond to physician-initiated questions about off-label uses."'
Third, the government will need to refute the argument that
regulating off-label promotional communications constitutes
constitutionally impermissible paternalism. The optimal approach is
again to focus on the government's interest in ensuring accurate,
unbiased communications. Of course, the FDA's regulatory
framework does not keep physicians "in the dark" about off-label
uses, as the Caronia majority insinuated.312 As the majority
recognized, the FDA openly permits some forms of company
communications about off-label uses that are reasonably designed to
hold companies accountable for their communications.313 The
majority actually criticized the FDA for taking an inconsistent
position about the utility of communications about off-label uses
because of these allowances, but the existence of these safe harbors
arguably shows that the FDA's intent is to permit the flow of truthful
information while preventing companies from disseminating
unsubstantiated claims through nontransparent mechanisms. That
approach is hard to square with the anti-paternalism trope of the
Caronia decision. The risk against which the FDA is trying to guard is
309. See supra notes 22-41 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text.
312. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 166 ("The First Amendment directs us to be especially
skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government
perceives to be their own good."(quoting 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S.
484, 503 (1996))).
313. See id. at 166-67; Mello, Studdert & Brennan, supra note 154, at 1559-60.
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not that "the public will respond 'irrationally' to the truth,"3 14 but that
it will not be told the whole truth.
It is also worth noting a distinction between the factual
circumstances surrounding off-label prescribing and those in other
cases, such as Virginia State Board, that formed the genesis of anti-
paternalism objections to commercial-speech restrictions. In Virginia
State Board, the restriction on pharmacy advertising was intended to
influence shoppers' choice of pharmacy.315 By contrast, we would
argue, in seeking to curb the excesses of off-label promotion of
medical products to physicians, the FDA seeks to protect not the
recipients of the promotion, but their patients. When physicians
decide to prescribe a drug for an unapproved use based on a biased
presentation of the evidence concerning that use, they put a third
party at risk of physical harm. Congress has tasked the FDA with the
responsibility to protect the public from unsafe and ineffective
drugs.316 It is not paternalism for the agency to discharge its
responsibility in this way.
3. Narrow Tailoring
The final component of the Central Hudson test is the
requirement that the restriction on commercial speech be no broader
than necessary to advance the government's objective.1 The
Supreme Court in Sorrell threw down a difficult gauntlet for the
government with respect to simultaneously satisfying this part of the
test and the third prong.318 On the one hand, commercial-speech
restrictions must be very narrowly drawn to meet the tailoring
requirement, but on the other, the Court took such a stringent view of
what directly and materially advances the government's interest that
it seems that nothing but a very broad speech restriction would have a
great enough impact to satisfy the third prong. The government is
further hamstrung by the requirement that the restriction be as
narrowly tailored as possible coupled with the requirement that it
avoid discriminating against a particular class of speakers. These
314. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 166 (quoting 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S.
484, 503 (1996)).
315. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 752
(1976).
316. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012).
317. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
318. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670-71 (2011); Mello & Messing,
supra note 139, at 1253 (noting the potential for states to be "whipsawed" between the
narrow-tailoring and direct-advancement prongs when attempting to regulate the sale of
prescriber data to protect physician privacy).
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tensions are real, but several arguments may help the government
prevail on the tailoring prong in future cases involving off-label
promotion regulation.
a. The FDA's Existing Approach Allows Some Forms of Off-
Label Promotional Speech
First, as discussed above, the FDA's regulatory regime for off-
label promotion is already limited and tailored.3 19 Through regulatory
guidance setting out safe harbors, the FDA has carefully identified
forms of off-label promotional communications that are permitted
because they are less likely than other forms to contain misleading
information. These safe harbors demonstrate the FDA's commitment
to tailoring its regulations to the objective of ensuring that
communications with physicians about drug uses convey accurate and
unbiased information. Companies are also free to engage in other
forms of truthful communication about potential new uses of their
drugs that do not fall within the category of promotional speech, such
as press releases, disclosures in SEC filings, and publication of clinical
study results in medical journals.320
b. Non-Speech-Restricting Alternatives Are Inadequate
Second, the policy approaches proposed by the Caronia majority
as alternatives to speech restrictions fall well short of the mark. Far
from working "equally well" as the FDA's chosen approach, as the
majority asserted,321 they range from ineffectual to impracticable to
just plain ridiculous. The first of five policies proposed by the
majority was to "guide physicians and patients in differentiating
between misleading and false promotion, exaggerations and
embellishments, and truthful or non-misleading information."3 2 2 The
nation's experience prior to the 1962 FDCA amendments amply
demonstrated that physicians could not distinguish between truthful
and misleading claims of drug efficacy, in part because of misleading
promotional statements.323  Even if didactic strategies for
distinguishing among the types of claims made in off-label promotion
and understanding the evidence base underlying them could be
identified, along with strategies for effectively reaching every
physician with this information, it is inconceivable that the
319. See supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text.
321. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 168 (2d Cir. 2012).
322. Id.
323. Waxman, supra note 10, at 306-07.
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government would appropriate funding at a level sufficient to create
an effective counterweight to the $50 billion that pharmaceutical
companies spend each year on promotion to physicians.3 24
The second proposed policy was for the FDA to "develop its
warning or disclaimer systems or develop safety tiers within the off-
label market."32 Experience in the field of "nutraceuticals" has
sufficiently demonstrated the ineffectiveness of warning labels that
alert consumers that the FDA has not validated the health claims
made about the product.326 Consumers spend billions on vitamins and
minerals with such labels that have no proof of efficacy.3 27 Disclaimers
were also deemed an inadequate remedy for the proliferation of
unsubstantiated claims of efficacy prior to the 1962 amendments to
the FDCA that required manufacturers to demonstrate effectiveness
as well as safety.328 It defies understanding how the FDA could
develop "safety tiers" for off-label uses of drugs since by very
definition these are uses for which all of the data that manufacturers
purport to have amassed are not provided to the FDA for review.
Even if the FDA developed a tiering system based on publicly
available data, sales representatives could argue (probably correctly)
that the ratings were not based on all of the available information
known to the manufacturer. Finally, because disclaimers have little
324. Kesselheim, Mello & Avorn, supra note 21, at 446 (citation omitted).
325. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 168.
326. See Tonya Dodge, Dana Litt & Annette Kaufman, Influence of the Dietary
Supplement Health and Education Act on Consumer Beliefs About the Safety and
Effectiveness of Dietary Supplements, 16 J. HEALTH COMM. 230, 230 (2011)
("[I]nformation about FDA approval failed to have a statistically significant effect on
beliefs about safety or effectiveness of the dietary supplement."). See generally Marlys J.
Mason & Debra L. Scammon, Health Claims and Disclaimers: Extended Boundaries and
Research Opportunities in Consumer Interpretation, 19 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 144
(2000) (finding no evidence to support the effectiveness of disclaimers related to health
claims).
327. See Eliseo Guallar et al., Enough Is Enough: Stop Wasting Money on Vitamin and
Mineral Supplements, 159 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 850, 850 (2013) ("[S]ales of
multivitamins and other supplements have not been affected by major studies with null
results, and the U.S. supplement industry continues to grow, reaching $28 billion in annual
sales in 2010.").
328. Waxman, supra note 10, at 300 ("[D]isclaimers disclosing the state of the evidence
supporting a claim... were inadequate to stop deceptive and dangerous products....
Disclaimers cannot in any way address the grave harm to patients caused by a marketplace
in which no one is sure which products work and which do not...."). Disclaimers were
judged inadequate even when directed at physicians rather than less sophisticated
consumers. See id. at 311 (arguing persuasively that both a required statement that the
FDA has not reviewed the claim and a required statement disclosing evidence sufficient
for consumers to gauge the truth of the claim would provide little useful information to
prescribers).
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effect on consumers' purchasing decisions, having to put a disclaimer
on the labeling probably would not provide sufficient incentive for
manufacturers to seek FDA approval for new drug uses. 3 29
The court's third proposal was that the government require
manufacturers to "list all applicable or intended indications when
they first apply for FDA approval, enabling physicians, the
government, and patients to track a drug's development."3 o This
information would indeed be helpful in creating a roadmap for
tracking the course of a drug's diffusion into clinical practice,
particularly if it was incorporated into a living document that was
updated over the drug's lifecycle as new uses emerge in clinical
practice or are investigated by the manufacturer.' It is not clear,
however, why the Caronia majority thought this would advance the
government's interests in safeguarding the integrity of its drug-
approval process or protecting patients from unsafe and ineffective
drugs. Requiring companies to go on record as to other potential uses
of their drug does nothing to eliminate the incentive problem that is
created when they are not required to seek FDA approval for those
uses in order to promote them without restriction. Nor does it give
physicians useful information with which to evaluate off-label uses or
promotional communications about off-label uses, or create any
mechanisms to protect patients from unsafe prescribing.
The court's fourth suggestion was that the FDA impose "ceilings
or caps on off-label prescriptions" or other mechanisms to restrict the
amount of off-label prescribing directly-or to prohibit off-label
prescribing entirely.332 Such suggestions are nonstarters for two
reasons. First, direct regulation of the practice of medicine is outside
the FDA's jurisdiction.33 Second, the FDA recognizes that off-label
329. Conko, supra note 220, at 180-81.
330. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 168.
331. Cf COMM. ON ETHICAL AND SCIENTIFIC ISSUES IN STUDYING THE SAFETY OF
APPROVED DRUGS, INST. OF MED., ETHICAL AND SCIENTIFIC ISSUES IN STUDYING THE
SAFETY OF APPROVED DRUGS 110-11 (2012) (proposing that all newly approved drugs,
as well as already approved drugs about which there are lingering concerns regarding
safety or efficacy, have a Benefit-Risk Assessment and Management Plan outlining what is
known about the drug and what plans exist for reducing uncertainty about safety and
effectiveness).
332. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 168.
333. See Promotion of Unapproved Drugs and Medical Devices, Testimony Before the
S. Comm. on Labor and Human Res., 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of William B.
Schultz, Deputy Comm'r for Policy, Food & Drug Admin.), available at
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm115098.htm ("Thus, once a drug is
approved for marketing, FDA does not generally regulate how, and for what uses,
physicians prescribe that drug.").
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prescribing can be helpful, and indeed, lifesaving in some clinical
situations,3" and has no apparent wish to deprive the public of those
benefits. It is ludicrous to suggest it would ban off-label prescribing
even if it had legal authority to do so and equally nonsensical to
propose that physicians be allowed to write only a certain number of
prescriptions off label. A blunt cap of that nature would do nothing to
distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate off-label
prescribing.335 Such a policy arrow is not in the FDA's quiver, and it
would land nowhere near the FDA's target of preventing harm from
inappropriate prescribing while preserving physicians' discretion to
determine when off-label use is clinically appropriate and ensuring
that they have accurate information with which to do so.
Finally, the court suggested that the government could "remind
physicians and manufacturers of, and even perhaps further regulate,
the legal liability surrounding off-label promotion and treatment
decisions."336 This proposal springs from a demonstrably wrong
notion that physicians and drug companies are unaware that they
operate under a substantial risk of being sued in tort. Much of the
most perverse behavior in medicine, such as "defensive medicine"
and secrecy concerning medical errors, springs from physicians'
perceptions that they practice every day under the threat of
potentially catastrophic malpractice litigation.337 Similarly, drug
companies are acutely aware of the threat of product-liability suits
and have threatened action against the public interest, including
discontinuation of essential products like vaccines, in response.338
Ratcheting up their perceived liability pressure is highly unlikely to
produce a socially desirable response. Because no non-speech-
restricting alternative policy could achieve the government's interest
even marginally and because the FDA has taken reasonable steps to
allow companies to communicate truthful information about off-label
uses in a responsible way, the FDA's regulatory scheme for off-label
334. See id. ("FDA knows that there are important off label uses of approved drugs.").
335. See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 179-80 (Livingston, J., dissenting) ("A ceiling on off-label
prescriptions... could needlessly (and simultaneously) result in the denial of some
effective treatments and the over-prescription of ineffective and even dangerous ones.
Finally, a ban on off-label prescriptions would be no better. Indeed, it would constitute an
unprecedented intrusion into the practice of medicine ...
336. Id. at 168 (majority opinion).
337. See Michelle M. Mello et al., "Health Courts" and Accountability for Patient
Safety, 84 MILBANK Q. 459,472 (2006).
338. Aaron S. Kesselheim, Safety, Supply, and Suits: Litigation and the Vaccine
Industry, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1485,1485 (2011).
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promotion should be considered narrowly tailored under Central
Hudson.
E. Expanded Use of "Safe Harbors" For Off-Label Promotion
A final strategy that the FDA could take to maintain oversight of
off-label marketing in an era of expanding commercial speech
protection is to adjust its current regulatory approach concerning off-
label promotion "safe harbors." The goal of this strategy would be to
provide a broader set of pathways for off-label promotion while
providing mechanisms to help ensure the reliability of the
communications. As discussed above, the FDA already offers
meaningful pathways for off-label communications that meet certain
quality standards-for example, by permitting distribution of peer-
reviewed journal articles discussing off-label uses.339 Providing
additional opportunities for speech about off-label uses may help
bolster the argument that the FDA's regulatory scheme is narrowly
tailored to advancing the goal of protecting the public from unsafe
prescribing.
Below, we discuss two potential mechanisms that the FDA could
use for this purpose, both of which represent new applications of
evidentiary standards already articulated in FDA regulations. The
regulations set forth three alternative forms of evidence that can form
the basis for a manufacturer to advertise a use of the drug that is
described in the drug's labeling.' Advertisements are permitted for
uses "for which the drug is generally recognized as safe and effective
among experts," "for which there exists substantial evidence of safety
and effectiveness" from "well-controlled investigations," and for uses
"for which there exists substantial clinical experience" that is
"adequately documented in medical literature or by other data."341
Any one of these forms of evidence is sufficient to support
advertisements. This regulation does not apply to promotion of off-
label uses-but it could be expanded to encompass them. Specifically,
we suggest expansion of the "substantial clinical experience" and
"substantial evidence" standards. This move would provide a way for
the FDA to permit speech about off-label uses while ensuring that
promotional communications hew closely to the evidence about a
drug's safety and efficacy.
339. See supra notes 42-45.
340. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2013).
341. Id. § 202.1(e)(4)(ii).
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1. Use of the "Substantial Clinical Experience" Standard
The first approach is to permit off-label communications in
circumstances in which the manufacturer can document that the
statements reflect substantial clinical experience. When evaluating
data that manufacturers submit regarding a drug's efficacy, the FDA
usually applies a "substantial evidence" standard, but FDA rules
stipulate that advertisements about a drug's efficacy for uses
described in the labeling may instead rest on documentation of
"substantial clinical experience."342 Substantial clinical experience is
defined as "substantial clinical experience adequately documented in
medical literature or by other data (to be supplied to the Food and
Drug Administration, if requested ... ), on the basis of which it can
fairly and responsibly be concluded by qualified experts that the drug
is safe and effective for such uses.. ..
The FDA has already made limited use of this standard. For
instance, a 2011 guidance document permitted manufacturers to
promote antihypertensive drugs as efficacious in producing health
outcomes not specifically tested in clinical trials based on a
"substantial clinical experience" rationale.3 " Usually, manufacturers
promoting their drug must make their advertising claims strictly
relate to the outcomes of the studies that they used to get the drug
approved, and these are the studies that are described in the
labeling? For most manufacturers of antihypertensive drugs, those
outcomes are reduction in patients' blood pressures or in the
incidence of clinical hypertension. However, these are intermediate
outcomes, and such manufacturers would naturally prefer to claim in
their marketing materials that regular use of their drugs in patients
with hypertension can prevent death due to cardiovascular events.
For a manufacturer that used only intermediate outcomes in
getting its new antihypertensive medication approved, such a claim
would be considered off-label promotion because the mortality
endpoint was not included in the trials or mentioned in the labeling.
In its 2011 guidance, however, the FDA announced that based on the
accumulated literature, it would allow manufacturers of approved
342. Id. § 202.1(e)(4)(ii)(c).
343. Id.
344. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OMB
CONTROL NO. 0910-0670, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: HYPERTENSION INDICATION:
DRUG LABELING FOR CARDIOVASCULAR OUTCOME CLAIMS 3, 5 (2011) [hereinafter
HYPERTENSION INDICATION], available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs
/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm075072.pdf.
345. § 202.1(e)(4)(i)(b).
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antihypertensives to make claims about improved cardiovascular
outcomes even if those outcomes were not tested in their randomized
trials.346 The FDA's stated rationale was that "blood pressure control
is well established as beneficial in preventing serious cardiovascular
events."347 Going forward, the FDA's guidance means that
manufacturers of newer antihypertensive drugs like aliskerin
(Tekturna), which was approved based on clinical trials showing that
it lowered patients' blood pressure, can promote their drugs as
effective in reducing cardiovascular mortality even though aliskerin's
labeling explicitly states that there are "no controlled trials
demonstrating risk reduction" of fatal and nonfatal cardiovascular
events with the drug.348
Application of the "substantial clinical experience" standard in
this antihypertensive drug scenario had two distinguishing features.
First, the decision was based on decades of clinical experience with
hypertension, antihypertensive drugs, and patient outcomes.349
Second, the announcement that off-label marketing would be
permitted came in an official, prospective FDA guidance document,
rather than in an ad hoc response to an individual manufacturer's
request.3 so Creation of such a guidance document involves substantial
internal deliberation and may involve input from outside experts.351
These two features should undergird broader applications of the
"substantial clinical experience" pathway as well. They increase the
likelihood that the information disseminated through off-label
promotion will be evidence-based and reliable.
Thus, we suggest that the FDA could modify this regulation to
apply the same standard to advertisements of off-label uses and take
steps to publicize the availability of this avenue of off-label
promotion-for example, in a guidance document. The main
346. HYPERTENSION INDICATION, supra note 344, at 1; Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry
Avorn, The Food and Drug Administration Has the Legal Basis to Restrict Promotion of
Flawed Comparative Effectiveness Research, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2200, 2201 (2012).
347. HYPERTENSION INDICATION, supra note 344, at 1.
348. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., HIGHLIGHTS OF PRESCRIBING INFORMATION:
TEKTURNA 2 (2012), available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda-docs
/label/2012/021985s0231bl.pdf.
349. See NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH & NAT'L HEART, LUNG, & BLOOD INST., DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE SEVENTH REPORT OF THE JOINT NATIONAL
COMMITTEE ON PREVENTION, DETECTION, EVALUATION, AND TREATMENT OF HIGH
BLOOD PRESSURE 1 (2004), available at http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/guidelines
/hypertension/jnc7full.pdf.
350. See HYPERTENSION INDICATION, supra note 344, at 1.
351. Eric Colman, Food and Drug Administration's Obesity Drug Guidance Document:
A Short History, 125 CIRCULATION 2156, 2156 (2012).
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advantage of the process is that it would be less rigid-and less
expensive-than a formal supplemental NDA,352 the traditional route
through which the FDA would have required antihypertensive drug
manufacturers to change their labeling to include patient mortality as
a reasonably predicted outcome.
A limitation of this arrangement is that the substantial clinical
experience standard has to this point been rarely invoked by FDA,
meaning that this proposal will not expand off-label marketing
opportunities for manufacturers far beyond the current precepts. It
may also take some time for the FDA to formally consider a request
for expanded marketing made under this principle. The 2011
hypertension guidance, for example, originally arose out of an FDA
Advisory Committee that reviewed class labeling for antihypertensive
drugs in June 2005.353 But as the FDA and its constituencies become
more comfortable with this pathway, bureaucratic adjustments could
make it more efficient and systematic.
2. Application of the "Substantial Evidence" Standard to
Observational Research on Drug Safety
In addition to expanded use of the "substantial clinical
experience" standard, the FDA might be able to provide additional
accommodations beyond its current flexibilities to evidence-based
off-label marketing in certain cases by expanding its view of what
constitutes "substantial evidence." Specifically, it could recognize the
possibility that manufacturers could submit well-controlled
observational research supporting a claimed safety benefit of their
drug.354
The advertising regulations define "substantial evidence" by
reference to any "adequate and well-controlled" investigation,3 5 but
the FDA's current posture appears to militate against the view that
observational studies can satisfy the standard-even though
observational studies can be designed to include comparators and
352. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5) (2013) (summarizing the new drug application
process).
353. HYPERTENSION INDICATION, supra note 344, at 2 ("On June 15, 2005, the
Cardiovascular and Renal Drugs Advisory Committee met in open public session to
discuss class labeling for cardiovascular outcome claims for drugs that are indicated to
treat hypertension.").
354. See Stuart L. Silverman, From Randomized Controlled Trials to Observational
Studies, 122 AM. J. MED. 114 (2009).
355. § 202.1(e)(4)(ii)(b).
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strong controls for confounding.356 For example, the pharmaceutical
manufacturer Hoffman-La Roche received a warning letter in 2010
regarding promotional materials for saquinavir (Invirase), a protease
inhibitor for treatment of human immunodeficiency virus that it
advertised as posing a lower risk of myocardial infarction than other
drugs in its class."' The communications at issue represented off-label
marketing because the manufacturer was promoting its drug as
providing benefits-greater safety than a competitor-that were not
in the drug's approved labeling.35 8 The warning letter arose because
the off-label marketing was based on a "retrospective nested case-
control study," which the FDA claimed was unreliable because it was
an observational study from which "[f]irm conclusions about the risks
of specific antiretroviral agents cannot be drawn."359 Rather, the FDA
asserted, "A randomized, controlled trial would need to be conducted
to determine the comparative effects of different treatments."6
Though the FDA may have been right about the strength of
observational evidence in this particular case, 61 the absolutist
language in its warning letter seems to preclude the possibility that
observational research could ever be used to support a claim of
comparative advantage. To the contrary, large-scale observational
studies are particularly well-suited for detecting and quantifying drug
safety problems.362 Randomized trials have several weaknesses as a
mechanism of detecting safety problems, chief among them that their
small sample sizes mean they are often inadequately powered to
356. The FDA's regulations generally consider that the adequate and well-controlled
investigation standard should be met with trials that compare treatment with the test drug
to an active or inactive comparator. Id. § 314.126(b)(2). However, these regulations permit
flexibility in the level of evidence that the FDA may accept in making judgments. Id. For
example, the FDA's regulation permits historical controls, with the caveat that "[blecause
historical control populations usually cannot be as well assessed with respect to pertinent
variables as can concurrent control populations, historical control designs are usually
reserved for special circumstances." Id. § 314.126(b)(2)(v).
357. Letter from Lynn Panholzer, Regulatory Review Officer, U.S. Food & Drug
Admin., to Inna Kissen, Dir., Dep't of Regulatory Affairs, Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. (Apr.
8, 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecompliance
regulatoryinformation/enforcementactivitiesbyfda/warninglettersandnoticeofviolationlette
rstopharmaceuticalcompanies/ucm209517.pdf (discussing NDA numbers 20-628, 21-785
(Invirase (saquinavir mesylate) capsules and tablets)).
358. Id. at 2.
359. Id. at 3.
360. Id.
361. See Kesselheim & Avorn, supra note 346, at 2202.
362. See, e.g., Jerry Avorn, In Defense of Pharmacoepidemiology-Embracing the Yin
and Yang of Drug Research, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2219, 2220 (2007); COMM. ON
ETHICAL AND SCIENTIFIC ISSUES IN STUDYING THE SAFETY OF APPROVED DRUGS,
supra note 331, at 181-84.
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measure uncommon adverse events.3 63 A strong argument can be
made that rigorous and well-controlled observational studies can
provide "substantial evidence" to support marketing statements
about a drug's safety profile. Indeed, the FDA has often used
observational studies as the basis for changing drug labeling to better
warn about possible adverse events, including adding black box
warnings, which are the strongest safety warning available. For
example, in 2008, the FDA added a black box warning to
conventional antipsychotic drugs such as haloperidol (Haldol)
describing increased risk of death for elderly patients with dementia-
related psychosis taking the drug."* The warning was added on the
basis of two government-funded observational research trials that
evaluated the risk of conventional antipsychotics like haloperidol
compared against the risk of more recent "atypical" antipsychotics,
which already had a black box warning about death in elderly
patients.365
If the FDA showed greater openness to the view that
comparative observational research could provide support for
manufacturers' safety-related promotional statements, that could
provide another pathway-short of formal supplemental new drug
applications-through which manufacturers could receive prospective
approval for some kinds of off-label marketing about their products.
There is already flexibility within the FDCA to permit the FDA to
consider observational studies or other evidence short of prospective
randomized trials as offering "substantial evidence" for a given
finding because the FDCA does not specify that substantial evidence
needs to be supported by randomized controlled trials, only
"adequate and well-controlled investigations."3 6 6 However, because of
the risk that such studies can yield unreliable results if not carefully
designed and conducted, the FDA's current wariness about
authorizing off-label marketing based on them is understandable.367
363. See COMM. ON ETHICAL AND SCIENTIFIC ISSUES IN STUDYING THE SAFETY OF
APPROVED DRUGS, supra note 331, at 173-77; Avorn, supra note 362, at 2220.
364. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., INFORMATION FOR HEALTHCARE
PROFESSIONALS: CONVENTIONAL ANTIPSYCHOTICS (2008), available at
www.fda.gov/drugs/drugsafety/postmarketdrugsafetyinformationforpatientsandproviders/
ucml24830.htm.
365. Sudeep S. Gill et al., Antipsychotic Drug Use and Mortality in Older Adults with
Dementia, 146 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 775, 775, 784 (2007); Sebastian Schneeweiss et
al., Risk of Death Associated with the Use of Conventional Versus Atypical Antipsychotic
Drugs Among Elderly Patients, 176 CANADIAN MED. ASS'N J. 627, 627 (2007).
366. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012).
367. See Kesselheim and Avorn, supra note 346, at 2202.
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To clarify its expectations, the FDA could issue a formal guidance
document describing the features of high-quality observational
research and the circumstances under which it might be sufficient (for
example, defining adverse event rates or clarifying randomized trial
findings) to support off-label marketing claims.36 This approach
would permit manufacturers to engage in truthful, evidence-based
communications about off-label uses while helping to assure that
unsubstantiated marketing claims do not provoke inappropriate,
unsafe prescribing.
CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit's decision in Caronia is the latest in a stream
of high-profile cases enunciating an expanding scope of judicial
recognition of commercial-speech rights. Decisions by the Supreme
Court and courts of appeals evince particular judicial distaste for
attempts to regulate pharmaceutical promotion, based in part on the
claimed public health importance of the free flow of truthful
information about medical products and in part from the role that
physicians, as sophisticated intermediaries, play as receptors of
pharmaceutical promotional communications. However, in the case
of off-label promotion, neither of these assumptions stands up to
closer scrutiny, and years of experience with industry marketing
practices leading to dangerous, non-evidence-based off-label uses of
medical products justify the need for regulation in this arena.
The immediate effect of Caronia on the FDA's efforts to police
off-label promotion are unclear: the FDA has voiced the opinion that
its enforcement efforts can proceed unhindered, but the decision
would appear to preclude some of its traditional enforcement
practices, at least in the Second Circuit states. Significant
retrenchment in the agency's enforcement activity would likely lead
to adverse health consequences. Companies would likely feel
emboldened to engage in more promotional communications with
fewer incentives to ensure that promotional statements have an
evidentiary basis, and they would find less reason to seek FDA
368. A recent report by an Institute of Medicine committee also came to the conclusion
that formal guidance on the appropriate design and use of observational studies for
assessing drug safety is needed. See COMM. ON ETHICAL AND SCIENTIFIC ISSUES IN
STUDYING THE SAFETY OF APPROVED DRUGS, supra note 331, at 159 (recommending
that the FDA issue a guidance document on the use of Bayesian methods); id. at 160
(recommending "guidance and review processes that ensure that observational studies
with high internal validity are given appropriate weight in the evaluation of drug harms");
id. at 162 (recommending that the FDA develop guidance on use of noninferiority designs
to assess drug safety).
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approval for new uses of their products. Such moves would heighten
the prevalence of prescribing decisions that put patients at undue risk
without offsetting benefits.
To help avoid such consequences, we suggest several avenues
along which the FDA might continue to prosecute off-label
promotion and defend its existing regulatory framework against
future challenges. Although the courts' commercial-speech
jurisprudence over the last three decades is dispiriting for advocates
of restrictions on off-label promotion, fighting to ensure that a
regulatory regime is in place to promote accurate and unbiased
promotional communications is a public health imperative.
